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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT 
The work on the expansion of inter-Latin American trade and the 
establishment of the regional market that the secretariat, in various 
resolutions adopted by the Governments members of the Economic Commission 
for Latin America at the sessions of the Commission and its Trade Committee, 
has been requested to undertake, includes the study of possible solutions 
to sub-regional problems which constitute obstacles to the attainment of 
the objectives in view. 
To this end, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela agreed to hold two series 
of meetings of experts on trade policy, one at Bogotá (November 195&) a^d 
the other at Caracas (May 1959)» 
In furtherance of the programme of which these two series of consultations 
formed a part, and at the request of the above-mentioned Governments, a 
third was convened by the secretariat at Quito, Ecuador, in December 3.960* 
This time the meetings were of an official character, since the competent 
authorities of the three countries considered that, in view of the work 
already carried out as well as of the new circumstances arising from 
the current movement towards multilateral economic co-operation in 
Latin America, the time had come to approach the topics concerned at 
the governmental level. 
An account of the proceedings, together with the conclusions reached 
by the three Governments at this third series of meetings, was given in 
document E/CN.12/C .1/17, the revised text of which is reproduced in the 
fallowing pages, with the addition of the papers prepared by the 
secretariat to facilitate discussion. 
The secretariat hereby submits all this documentation to the 
Governments members of the Commission, for consideration at the ninth 
session of ECLA and the third session of the Trade Committee, which 
will be held concurrently at Caracas, in May 1961. 

CONSULTATIONS ON TRADE POLICY: REPORT 
OF THE THIRD SERIES OF MEETINGS 
BETWEEN COLOMBIA, ECUADOR 
AND VENEZUELA 
(Quito, 7 to 10 December I960) 
j E/CN»12/0,1/17 | 
I J „ 5 
a * 
i i ? 27 December I960 j 
Editorial note: Some changes have been introduced in the presentation 
of the original document, which in no way affect its content» 
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kr, PURPOSE OF THE MEETINGS. MEMBERSHIP 
M D ORGANIZATION OF WORK 
Purpose of the meetings 
1, In furtherance of the work programme under which the two previous series 
of similar consultative meetings had been held (at Bogotá in 1958 and at 
Caracas in 1959), the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela requested 
the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECIA) to convene 
a third series¿ with the primary object of considering along what lines these 
countries* trade policy might best be channelled in respect of their reciprocal 
economic and trade relations, with due regard to the new situations created by 
the active movement towards multilateral co-operation in which most of the 
Latin American countries were taking part. 
Opening and closing meetings 
2. The third series of consultations was held in the Law Courts (Palacio 
Legislativo) at Quito, Ecuador, from 7 to 10 December I960. At the opening 
meeting, which took place in the assembly hall of the Casa de Cultura, an 
address was delivered by Mr. José Ceballos CarriSn, Minister of Economic 
Affairs of Ecuador. Mr. Misael Pastrana Borrero, Minister of Public 
Works of Colombia, spoke on behalf of the delegations presento A statement 
was made to the meeting by Mr. Esteban Ivovich, Chief of the ECLA Trade 
Policy Division. 
3» The closing meeting was held on 10 December I960. The speakers on 
this occasion were Mr. Enrique Tejera Paris, representative of Venezuela, 
who voiced the delegations1 gratitude for the hospitality extended to the 
third series of consultations by Ecuador, and Mr. Esteban Ivovich, Chief of 
the ECLA Trade Policy Division. 
4. At the closing meeting, the present report of the third series of 
consultations was adopted. 
Membership and attendance 
5. The meetings were attended by delegations representing the Governments 
of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. The complete list of representatives 
appears in an annex to the present report. 
6. In virtue of the relevant applications submitted by their Governments, 
Mr, Ramón Meira Cerantes and Mr. Adolfo Crespo Ramírez were present at the 
consultations as observers for Argentina and Mexico, respectively. 
/7. Mr. Pascual 
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7. Mr a Pascual Montanero, representing the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (of the United Nations (FAO)), attended the meetings as an observer«, 
Organization of work 
Election of officers 
8» At the third series of consultative meetings, the following officers 
were elected: 
Chairman: Mr» José Ceballos Carrién (Ecuador) 
Vice-chairmen: Mr. Misael Pastrana Borrero (Colombia) 
Mr. José Luis Sâlcedo Bastardo (Venezuela) 
9» The secretariat for these meetings was formed by Mr. Esteban Ivovich^ 
Chief of the ECLA Trade Policy Division; Mr. Alejandro Power, member of 
the ECLA Trade Policy Division, who acted as Secretary-General; and Mr. 
Julio Prado Vallejo, an official of the Ministry of Economic Affairs of 
Ecuador, as Assistant Secretary-General. 
B. AGENDA 
10, At the first meeting, held on 7 December, the following agenda was 
adopted: 
I. General statements 




Recent trends in bilateral agreements between Colombia, Ecuador 
and Venezuela (working paper) 
III. Characteristics and mechanism of a possible multilateral treaty 
IV. Effects of possible participation in a multilateral instrument on 
the bilateral treaties in force between Colombia^ Ecuador and 
Venezuela 
V« Guiding principles for future trade policy in relation to the Latin 
American movement towards multilateral economic co-operation 
Documentation 
Suggested guiding principles for the participation of. Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela in the Latin American movement towards multi-





(a). Consultations on trade policy (Bogotá, 13-18 November 1958) 
(E/CN.12/C.1/11), pp. 15 et seq0 
(b) Consultations on trade policy (Caracas, 2-7 May 1959) 
(E/CN.12/C.l/U/Add.2) 
VI. Findings of the first session of the Working Group on Customs 
Questions with regard to the participation of Colombia, Ecuador 
and Venezuela in inter-Latin American Multilateral treaties 
Do cum ent at ion : 
Informe de la primera reunión del grupo de traba.jo para asuntos 
aduaneros (Montevideo 1-12 de agosto de I960) que se eleva al 
Comité de Comercio de la CEP AL (E/CN. 12/C .l/kG#3/4/Rev. l) 
C. ACCOUNT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Opening adresses and general statements 
11» At the opening meeting of this series of consultations, Mr« José 
Ceballos Carrión, Minister of Economic Affairs of Ecuador, welcomed the 
delegations, and was thanked on behalf of the delegations of Colombia and 
Venezuela by Mr® Misael Pastrana Borrero, Minister of Public Korks of 
Colombia. In both addresses, anphasis was laid on the importance of the 
third series of meetings in view of the need to study potentially suitable 
methods of channelling the trade policy of the Greater-Colombia countries, 
both in their reciprocal relations and vis-a-vis the other Latin American 
republics, along co-operative lines conducive to the economic development 
of all, to the co-ordination of that development on equitable terms and to 
the expansion of Latin America1s intra-regional and extra-regional trade 
alike. In both addresses, too, appreciative reference was made to ECLA!s 
collaboration in the technical elucidation of problems bearing on trade 
policy and on the acceleration of economic development in the Greater-
Colombia countries, as well as to the preparation of the requisite studies 
for the third series of consultative meetings. 
12. Mr. Esteban Ivovich, Chief of the ECLA Trade Policy Division, after 
thanking the previous speakers for their praise of the secretariat's 
work, made a brief statement on the implementation of the resolutions 
adopted by the Governments members of the Commission in connexion with 
/the formation 
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the formation of the common market * and on the relevant activities under 
way in respect of Central Merica and of the Free-Trade Association 
established by six South American countries, plus Mexico, under the 
Montevideo Treaty. 
13. The discussion opened with a general statement by each delegation. 
That of Ecuador stressed the need for an objective evaluation of the 
factors which might be of real use in the task of offsetting and overcoming 
the repercussions on levels of living in the Latin American countries, 
produced by such circumstances as the now traditional deterioration of the 
terms of trade, and the difficulty of installing certain industries on 
account of the limited size of individual domestic markets. Another 
serious problem was that of agriculture^ incapacity to provide employment 
for the increasing manpower supply deriving from the rapid growth of the 
population. 
14. From the foregoing standpoints, the intention underlying the Montevideo 
Treaty was laudable, especially if it resulted in the provision of 
efficacious incentives for the establishment of industries that would 
eventually be able to produce on competitive terms. It was only natural, 
however, that in view of the particular structure of its economy, and of 
such considerations as the close relationship between its foreign trade and 
fiscal revenue, Ecuador, before adopting any definite attitude to the new 
circumstances affecting Latin American trade policy, should make a 
searching examination of the problems that would be created if it were 
to accede to a multilateral instrument of the Montevideo type. 
15. Given Ecuador's geographical proximity to the other two Greater-
Colombia countries^ its traditional links with them and certain problens 
and interests which they all shared, it should first be considered whether 
the best plan for the moment, might not be to pursue a policy aiming at the 
formation of a common market among the three countries in question, with 
the idea of subsequently studying the possibility of their accession, 
en bloc, to the Montevideo Treaty. At all events, Ecuador would attach 
great importance to any light that might be shed on that point. 
/I6e The 
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16. The delegation of Colombia called attention to the differences 
between the atmosphere and circumstances of the third series of consultations 
and of the two that had preceded it. A new and highly significant factor 
had now made its appearance, in the shape of the Montevideo Treaty - signed 
by seven countries, four of which had already ratified it -, whose advent 
was bound to influence the trade policy of the whole of Latin America, At 
the two previous series of consultative meetings, the problems of trade and 
the prospects for its expansion as between Colombia^ Ecuador and Venezuela 
had been discussed mainly from the angle of bilateral relations, but the 
desirability of perhaps reaching a tripartite agreement had also been borne 
in mind, at least with regard to certain aspects of the desired economic 
co-operation. The circumstances arising out of the Montevideo Treaty made 
it necessary to revise the criteria which had prevailed at the two series 
of meetings mentioned* If that revision - which would have to be under^ -
taken during the Quito consultations - were to lead to the conclusion that 
it was advisable or essential to sign the Montevideo Treaty, a joint or 
co-ordinated approach on the part of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela would 
unquestionably facilitate the solution of the problems presented by their 
accession to that instrument, whether the step were taken by all three 
countries simultaneously or by only one or two of than for the time being. 
17. To assuage the popular unrest deriving from its low per capita 
income levels, Colombia, like the other Latin American countries, was 
making every endeavour to improve its rate of development. Among the 
internal and external factors that constituted requisites for the attainment 
of such an end, it was impossible to overlook the expansion of the market 
on bases broad enough for import substitution to be extended to the 
manufacture of durable consumer and capital goods. This would be the sole 
way to achieve economic and specialized production, which was a goal 
impossible to attain when only small consumer markets were available© A 
free-trade area such as that instituted by the Montevideo Treaty afforded, 
in relation both to that and to other vital problems, glimpses of brighter 
prospects than could be opened up by bilateral agreements or a possible 
tripartite pact among the Greater-Colombia countries. 
/18. The 
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1B0 The delegation of Venezuela, in its turn, expressed sincere interest 
in Latin American integration. Venezuela had traditionally been an 
advocate of Latin American unity in the political and economic spheres. 
In face of the tendency observable in the economies of the region and of 
the world to seek integration as a means towards the acceleration of 
development, it seemed difficult for a country to stand aloof from the 
movement and try to pursue in isolation, or on bilateral bases, a policy 
beneficial to its national interests» But despite Venezeula!s conviction 
to that effect, its situation at the moment was such - owing to special 
circumstances of which everyone was aware - that it could not adopt 
decisions or take action with a view to acceding to associations like that 
constituted by the Montevideo Treaty, whose usefulness it considered obvious* 
Should one or more of the Greater-Colombia countries be in a position to 
decide to sign that instrument forthwith, Venezuela would view such a step 
with satisfaction, since the possible future accession of the others would 
thereby be facilitated. 
Recent trends in bilateral agreements between Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela 
19. In the course of the discussion on recent trends in the concerting, 
of bilateral agreements among the three countries, .it was pointed out that 
practical results had so far been obtained only in the Colombo-Ecuadorian 
sector, notwithstanding the full and comprehensive elucidation of the 
problems and possibilities existing in the case of Colombia and Venezuela 
and in that of Venezuela and Ecuador, for which the Bogota and Caracas 
consultations on trade policy had afforded opportunities. Hence it had 
become necessary to determine whether the programme of work which was being 
developed at the consultative meetings should hold firaly by bilateralism 
or should veer in the direction of a broader multilateral formula, either 
tripartite or of more ambitious regional scope. 
20. In this context, the delegation of Colombia said that its country's 
efforts in the field of bilateral agreements were well known, their aim having 
been to convert into a reality the solutions advocated at the two previous 




would have to be adjusted to the new contingencies arising out of the 
Montevideo Treaty« Since the altered circumstances called for a change 
of attitude, in the future the necessary formulae would have to be sought 
within the multilateral framework, with due regard to the situations 
created by the existing bilateral instruments and to the need to maintain 
or reach special agreements in connexion with particular problems 
originating in geographical proximity or other causes, 
21» In the opinion of the delegation of Venezuela, the bilateral system, 
while it had been useful when different conditions prevailed in the Latin 
American and world economies, had ceased to be so, in view of current trends 
in trade relations. Venezuela had not responded of late, nor did it 
intend to respond, to the overtures it had received from various European 
and. Latin American countries with a view to the concerting of bilateral 
pacts; for it considered that the multilateral course was of greater 
benefit to all concerned. Its position in that respect was unequivocal, 
although it recognized that certain specific problems might in a few 
instances necessitate the conclusion of an occasional bilateral agreement. 
The signing of new bilateral trade treaties would make it more difficult 
for Venezuela to accede to multilateral agreanents, which were in its 
opinion the best suited to the times. 
22. The conclusion emerging from the discussion of item II of the agenda 
was that, generally speaking, the? three countries regarded multilateralism 
as.the more advantageous course to follow in their economic co-operation 
and trade relations, without repudiating such bilateral arrangements as 
might be essential for the solution of problems affecting only two of the 
countries, not all three. 
Possible participation of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela 
in multilateral instruments 
23» In view of their interdependence, the topics covered by items III, IV 
and V of the agenda were taken together. 
24« One of the moot points raised was whether the desired multilateralism 
would prove more beneficial if it were confined to the three countries or if 
it were extended to a wider orbit like that resulting from the Montevideo 
/Treaty. In 
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Treaty« In the relevant s tat orients it x^ as recognised that the framewoi"k 
afforded by the territories of the seven signatories of the Montevideo Treaty 
would of course permit of complenentarity and specialized production in respect 
of a longer list of articles than could form the basis of trade within the 
narrower bounds of a tripartite agreement. The complexity of contemporary 
technological developnent and the increasing diversification of the supplies 
needed by a rapidly growing population made it advisable for efforts to be 
directed, in so far as was feasible, towards the establishment of a 
multilateral market proper. 
25. It was felt that the meetings offered a favourable opportunity for 
consultations among the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, 
in order to determine the policy that should be pursued if any or all of 
those countries were to decide to participate in Latin American economic 
integration agreements. Next, therefore, the delegations reviewed some 
of the principal characteristics of the Montevideo Treaty and of its 
mechanisms, as well as the nature of its provisions for special treatment 
to be accorded to contracting parties at a relatively less advanced stage 
of economic development. They then analysed the repercussions on the 
bilateral agreements in force between the Greater-Colombia countries that 
might result from a decision on the part of any or all of than to accede 
to the Montevideo Treaty. 
26. In that connexion, and at the request of several members of the 
delegations, the representatives of the ECLA secretariat supplied various 
technical data bearing on points 2 and 3 of the document entitled 
Suggested guiding principles for the participation of Colombia» Ecuador 
and Venezuela in the Latin American movement towards multilateral economic 
co-operation. 
Findings of the first session of the Working Group 
on Customs Questions 
27. The delegations took note with satisfaction of the ECLA document 
containing a summary record of the conclusions reached at the meetings of 
customs experts held at Montevideo, from 1 to 12 August i960, with respect 
to the standardization or co-ordination of certain aspects of customs 
/ systems., in 
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systems, in particular nomenclature, determination and checking of customs 
value and definition of basic customs terms. An account was also given 
of the existing programmes for carrying out the work in question. 
28o The delegations recognized the importance of such matters, and 
especially of the readjustments that would have to be made in the national 
systans concerned to enable each country to participate, if it so desired, 
in multilateral treaties. They therefore declared their intention of taking 
the necessary action to promote the study of the questions referred to, 
for which the competent government departments in their countries were 
responsible. 
Co-operation of ECLA 
29* In the course of discussion, the delegations expressed the wish that 
ECLA should extend its co-operation with the Greater-Colombia countries to 
the following fields: 
(a) Preparation of projects to ensure complementarity among the 
three countries - taking into account both technical and trade 
policy considerations - in respect of the petrochemical and 
the steel and aluminium making industries; 
(b) Consultations and preliminary studies to pave the xfay for 
implementation of the agreement reached at the second series of 
consultations on trade policy (Caracas, 1959)$ with regard to 
co-ordination of the activities of the official economic 
programming organs of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. 
Alternative possibilities for multilateral action 
30. when all the items on the agenda had been dealt with, the delegation 
Ecuador proposed that in order to define the points on which agreonent 
had been reached, a precise reply "should be given to the following questions: 
(a) If the three Greater-Colombia countries were to decide in 
favour of multilateralism, would they aim at forming a 
tripartite association? 
(b) Would such a step constitute the first phase in a programme of 
action designed to culminate in the accession of the Greater-
Colombia counties, en bloc, to the Montevideo Treaty? 
/(c) Would the 
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(c) Would the current third series of consultations leave Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela in a, position to decide individually as 
to their possible immediate accession to the Montevideo Treaty? 
(d) Would any member or members of the Greater-Colombia group that 
acceded to the Montevideo Treaty be able to maintain the 
existing bilateral treaties with other members? If so, on 
what bases? 
31» The delegation of Colombia suggested the desirability of studying 
in addition one or two alternative possibilities for the action to be taJcen, 
in connexion with the fact that public opinion in that country was. in 
favour of its early accession to the Montevideo Treaty, if possible prior 
to the conducting of .the first tariff negotiations and to the definition of 
certain basic criteria which would have to be established by the organs 
of the Treaty in question. The alternative formulae suggested for the 
ingress of Colombia and Ecuador to the Latin American Fre6-Trade Association 
could be summed up as follows: 
A# In the event of simultaneous accession: 
(a) The concessions granted in the bilateral treaty in the form in 
which it was in force at the date of deposit of the instruments 
of accession would be extended to the other members of the 
Association; or 
(b) The tariff treatments instituted by the bilateral treaty would be 
renegotiated within the Association, with the exception of those 
which exclusively benefited' Ecuador in respect of its exports 
to Colombia, and which could therefore be recognized by the 
Association under the terms of chapter VIII of the Montevideo 
Treaty. Border trade régimes would also be excluded; or 
(c) Before Colombia and Ecuador joined the Association, those aspects 
of their bilateral treaty which related to tariff treatment would 
be denounced. 
/Bo In the 
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B® In the event of a separate decision: 
(a) The first country to join the Association would extend to the 
other members the tariff concessions granted in the Colombo-
Ecuadorian bilateral treaty, in so far as they affected the 
imports of the country concerned; or 
(b) Prior to accession by unilateral or joint decision, those 
clauses of the Colombo-Ecuadorian bilateral treaty which dealt 
with tariff concessions would be denounced, 
32« Before discussion of the foregoing alternatives began,, the delegation 
of Venezuela reaffirmed its Government's interest in the Montevideo Treaty, 
which it regarded as an initial step towards the desired formation of the 
Latin American common market« Venezuela did not consider its participation 
unlikely if, when the time came, the organs of the Latin American Free 
Trade Association duly took into account certain special features of the 
country's economic structure. The same delegation also stated that the 
Government of Venezuela set a high value on ECLA's co-operation in the 
necessary technical elucidation both of potential solutions for the problems 
relating to Venezuela's possible accession to the Montevideo Treaty, and 
of the advantages that might accrue therefrom; and in that connexion it 
requested the secretariat's collaboration. 
FINAL DECLARATION 
33» As the outcome of the relevant discussions, at the closing meeting the 
three delegations formulated the following declaration on behalf of their 
respective Governments: 
The delegations attending the third series of consultations on trade policy 
between Colombia» Ecuador and Venezuela, 
Having considered the circumstances that have arisen since the series 
of consultative meetings held at Bogota and Caracas, and in particular 
the fact that several countries have signed and ratified the Treaty concluded 
at Montevideo on 18 February I960, whereby a Free Trade Area is established 
and the Latin American Free-Trade Association is instituted, 
/Bearing in mind 
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Bearing^ in mind that because of their geographical contiguity and 
because they form part of a single economic area, it is incumbent upon 
then to aim at the closest possible reciprocal co-operation, without being 
deterred thereby from collaborating in arrangements of wider regional scope9 
Considering that the expansion and liberalization of trade, in so far 
as it will provide broader markets for their increasing agricultural and 
industrial production, may constitute an important factor in the accelera-
tion of the development of their respective economies, and, consequently, 
in the improvement of their peoples1 levels of living, 
Declare: 
1. That the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela recognize 
the Montevideo Treaty as a suitable instrument for expediting the fuller 
and more balanced development of the Latin American economy; 
2. That the Governments of Colombia and Ecuador will take the 
necessary steps towards formally joining at the earliest possible date 
the Latin American Free-Trade Association instituted by the Montevideo Treaty* 
The Government of Venezuela, while fully endorsing the opinions enbodied 
in the foregoing consideranda, reserves for a future occasion any statement 
on its possible accession to the Latin American Free-Trade Association; 
3« That the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela will take 
immediate joint action to secure for Ecuador, within the above-mentioned 
Association, the special treatment for which the Montevideo Treaty makes 
provision in favour of contracting parties at a less advanced stage of 
economic development, since Ecuador considers this an essential condition 
of its accession to the Montevideo Treaty; 
4« That the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, bearing 
in mind the special conditions prevailing in the economy of the last-
named country, will likewise take joint action with the object of securing 
special treatment for Venezuela, to offset the disadvantages it would 
suffer if its accession to the Montevideo Treaty were affected without due 
regard to the peculiar features of its present economic structure; 
5« That the Governments of Colombia and Ecuador will study ways and 
means of adapting their bilateral agreements to the characteristics and 




unfavourable repercussions on the economies of their respective countries 
which their accession to the said Treaty might produce; 
6. That the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela request 
the ECLA secretariat to study, in consultation with thon, the problems 
relating to the participation of each of the three countries in the 
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The papers presented below had hitherto been issued 
only for limited distribution and for the internal 
use of the Third Series.of Consultations on Trade 
Policy. In the second paper, Suggested guiding 
principles for the participation of Colombia, Ecua- . 
dor and Venezuela in the Latin American movement to-> 
wards multilateral economic co-operation,one or two 





RECENT TRENDS- IN BILATERAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN 
COLOMBIA, ECUADOR AND VENEZUELA 
1. The paper entitled "Suggested guiding principles for the participation 
of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela in the Latin American movement towards 
multilateral economic co-operation" includes brief references to the trade 
treaties in existence among the Greater-Colombia countries. The present 
report enlarges upon these references in an endeavour to present a picture 
of the most important aspects and trends of contractual relations among 
the countries in question. 
I. BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND ECUADOR 
2. Since 1942, trade relations between Colombia and Eaiador have been 
governed by the treaty signed in that year and by supplementary instruments 
such as the 1949 payments agreement. The 1942 treaty establishes reciprocal 
freedom of trade and navigation and identical treatment for Colombian and 
Ecuadorian capital, as well as the application of the mostfavoured-nation 
clause in respect of customs, navigation, exchange controls and import 
régimes. It also exempts a number of commodities from customs duties. 
However, certain import restrictions of a general nature adopted by Colombia 
from :balance-of-payments motives, and others, relating to- tariffs, instituted 
by Ecuador, have virtually annulled the effect of the customs exemptions. 
1. The 1959 trade agreement 
3. These circumstances, and others deriving from the need to regulate their 
intensive border trade, induced the two countries to conduct negotiations 
based on the principles laid down in the so-called Bogotá Declaration of 1958, 
which culminated in August 1959 with the signing of three treaties - one 
relating to trade, one to payments and a third to economic co-operation -
that have already been ratified by Ecuador, although not yet by Colombia. 
4. The 1959 treaty establishes the unconditional and unlimited application 
of the most-favoured-nation clause, with a reservation in favour of the 
preferences accorded by Colombia or Ecuador to adjacent countries in order 
to facilitate border trade# 





the same treatment as domestically-produced goods. If import quotas are 
imposed, the country applying them shall accept from the other a volume of 
imports at least equal to its contribution to the supplies concerned in 
previous years. 
a) Customs treatment for Ecuadorian products 
5. Under the terms of the 1959 treaty, substantial tariff concessions are 
granted in favour of goods produced by Ecuador. The products affected are 
mainly primary commodities, in particular those grown in the Sierra - such 
as wheat, rice, maize, dry pulses, barley, malt and fresh fruit - and sugar. 
The implementation of these provisions would be a xvay of regularizing a 
traffic which at the present time is in great measure clandestine. Ecuador's 
production of the above-mentioned articles for the Colombian market is 
apparently expected to expand appreciably, perhaps with the co-operation of 
Colombian capital, when the new tariff régime is applied in their favour. 
• . The treaty also refers to cacao from Ecuador,. Colombia has been 
absorbing a considerable volume of Ecuador's experts of this commodity, which 
is an important one for the latterTs balance of payments. Despite the fact 
that programmes for the development of cacao-growing are under way in Colombia, 
the treaty establishes the right of free entry for the Ecuadorian product. 
6. It is of interest to note that the treaty institutes customs exemptions 
for Colombia's imports of certain chemical and laboratory products 
manufactured in Ecuador. 
7. Those Ecuadorian products which are the object of tariff concessions 
on Colombia's part can be freely imported into the latter country. Imports 
of wheat and barley are effected by the Colombian National Institute of 
Supplies (Instituto Nacional de Abastecimiento - INA), whose purchases are 
intended to bridge the gap between domestic production and demand. 
b) Customs treatment for Colombian products 
8. Ecuador abolishes the duties on various Colombian chemical and 
pharmaceutical products and grants reductions ranging from 10 to 70 per cent 
in respect of many manufactures. The tariff régime for Colombian textiles 
comprises a specific duty varying between 7 and 17.60 sucres per kilogramme, 
plus a 10-per-cent ad valorem duty. These rates seem to have been calculated 




and the consequent discouragement of contraband. It is common knowledge that 
in recent years the improvement of productivity in Colombia's textile industry 
and the devaluation of the national currency have weighted the scales in favour 
of Colombia as regards the price difference between the two countries' textile 
products. Consequently, the Ecuadorian mills, although not working at full 
capacity, would seem to be accumulating an exceptionally large volume of stocks. 
It is hoped that the tariff regime applicable to textiles under the terms of 
the treaty will help to restore the situation to normal. Ecuador also 
accords Colombia customs reductions - and in some cases exemptions - in favour 
of such industrial products as plate glass and glass manufactures; aluminium 
and enamelware; electrical materials; agricultural machinery, machinery for 
the building industry and machine-tools; and hpusehold electrical appliances 
(wireless receiving sets, electric razors, etc»)# Similarly, a number of 
important concassions - reductions and exemptions - are granted to the 
Colombian chemical and pharmaceutical industry, 
c) Charges other than tariff duties 
9. The two countries reciprocally consolidated charges equivalent in effect 
to customs duties, for goods on which the latter were negotiated. Among the 
charges thus consolidated are the Ecuadorian consular fee of 9.5 per cent and 
the special 10-per-cent rate applied by Colombia to cacao imports. 
d), Exclusive character of customs treatment 
10. The treaty contains several clauses relating to the nature of the 
special customs treatment which the two countries accord each other. Article 
» 
VII states that the benefits reciprocally granted, especially those connected 
with the tariff régime, are conceded-in virtue of their being adjacent States^ /« 
It should be, noted that in-respect of the products covered by the special 
treatment neither of the two parties has specific commitments with third 
countries, except those of a generic character deriving from the most-favoured-
nation clause. 
e) Border trade 
U . The treaty defines "border tr^de" as that which supplies essential 
commodities for use and consumption in towns and villages on the frontier. 
The joint standing commission instituted by the treaty is to lay before the 
1/ The economic co-operation agreement which Colombia and Ecuador signed 
in 1959 at the same time as the trade treaty defines the exclusive 




Governments draft proposals for a bilateral agreement which would serve as 
a basis for each country's internal regulations with respect to border trade. 
2. The payments agreement 
12. On the same date as the trade treaty, Colombia and Ecuador signed a 
payments agreement establishing the dollar of account for purposes'of their 
transactions, quoted at the same rate as the free United States dollar for 
similar operations, and on the basis of a swing crédit of up to half a million 
dollars. When the'balance exceeds this limit, the creditor country may 
request the total or partial transfer of the excess to another clearing 
account in operation with a third Latin American country, or may reach an 
agreement with the debtor country for the payment of the excess in other 
exchange. If, within a period of six months, the excess is not cleared by 
one or other of the methods referred to, the creditor country may request 
total or partial payment in free United States dollars, by cable transfer. 
This payments agreement, which is in line with the more flexible 
principles of the Montevideo standard agreement,^supersedes that of 1949, 
which in its turn was modified in 1951 with the aim of converting the 
system of import and export licences reimbursable in national currencies into 
one whereby the value of the operations concerned would be reimbursed in 
dollars. The 1949-51 agreement stipulated that balances on the account 
were to be liquidated every six months at the creditor's request and that 
their equivalent in dollars would be paid in that currency not later than 30 
days from the date of liquidation. 
3. Economic co-operation 
13. Together with the trade treaty and the payments agreement, an instrument 
relating to economic co-operation was signed, with the object of fostering the 
smooth co-ordination of the two countries1 national economic development and 
trade policies. Among other measures to this end, the Governments of 
Colombia and Ecuador agreed to promote understandings between individual 
sectors, adopt provisions for the rapprochement of their respective markets 
within the general framework of Latin American integration, encourage the 
2/ Adopted at the first session of the Central Banks forking Group, held at 
Montevideo from 29 April to 10 May 1957> as can be seen in the relevant 
report (E/CN.12/C.1/W.1/5) incorporated in document E/CN.12/484. 
/ formation of 
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formation of private enterprises on a basis of public or private capital and 
sponsor the establishment of a system of consultations on the policy to be 
pursued at economic congresses or with regard to accession to multilateral 
3/ 
pacts affecting both parties®*' 
II. BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA 
1. The former modus vivendi 
14. At the present time no trade agreement exists between Colombia and 
Venezuela, From 1934 to 1948 a frontier agreement, renewable annually, was 
in force. It did not include the most-favoured-nation clause, and established 
that Venezuelan salt imported through the customs: houses of Cucuta and Arauca 
should enter Colombia duty-free» It also accorded tariff exemption to 
cattle - up to 25,000 head a year - exported from Venezuela to the Colombian 
department of Norte de Santander. This measure facilitated the fattening of 
Venezuelan cattle in Colombia, The instrument also stipulated that the 
customs duty on tinned fish from Venezuela should not exceed 15 Colombian 
centavos per kilogramme of gross weight. 
Venezuela in turn refrained from taxing Colombian exports ór imports in 
transit. The same exemption was enjoyed by goods from Cucuta which had to 
cross Venezuelan territory on their way to the Colombian Petroleum Company's 
camps in Catatumbo, and those passing through Venezuela in transit to Arauca. 
15* As from August 1948 the modus vivendi was allowed to lapse, partly on 
account of the circumstances to be described below. However, pursuant to 
an administrative resolution adopted in that same year, the Venezuelan 
Government continues to maintain the exemption from transit dues in Colombia's 
favour. 
The reasons for the failure to renew the modus vivendi include the fact 
that Colombia began to produce enough salt to satisfy the demand generated 
in areas adjacent to the Venezuelan frontier - in particular, that of stock-
breeders in the Llanos - as a result of improvements in the transport system 
and because the salt trade had been centralized in the Banco de la República. 
2/, This provision of the treaty is in harmony with the resolution adopted by 
the Joint Colombo-Venezuelan Commission to the effect that they should hold 
consultations, together with Ecuador,,on matters relating to the determin-
ation of attitudes vis-a-vis intra-regional multilateral agreements. In 




Furthermore, the non-tariff restrictions on imports of consumer goods imposed 
in Colombia from balance-of-payments motivés affected Venezuelan exports 
of tinned fish. This, and the progressive shortage of exportable cattle in 
Venezuela, virtually put a stop to traffic in the commodities which for years 
had been among the most important items in border trade. Thenceforward, 
the trade in question expanded and became more diversified, but the balances 
registered were in favour of Colombia, thus reversing the previous situation, 
2, Changes in border trade 
16, Since 1948, when the Colombo-Venezuelan modus vivendi ceased to be 
applied, the need to solve the problems of trade between the two countries, 
especially those originating in border trade characteristics and disequilibria, 
has become manifest,^ At the same time, it is clear that the conclusion 
of a trade agreement between them is no easy matter, owing to the peculiar 
structure of their respective economies and to the influence exerted on the 
scope and balance of trade movements by the differing evolution of their 
currency situations. 
Thus, when the Colombian peso stood at par with or higher than the 
bolivar and, concurrently, customs duties and other import charges and 
restrictions were heavier in Colombia than in Venezuela, the flow of border 
traffic was primarily in the direction of Colombia or, at least, was 
relatively well-balanced. As the devaluation of the Colombian peso was 
intensified, without a corresponding rise in domestic production costs, the 
Venezuelan importer found that he could buy many Colombian goods at a price 
lower than he would have to pay for similar articles from home sources or 
from a third .country. VJith the increase in the bolivar's purchasing power 
in terms of Colombian merchandise, demand expanded, while sufficient counter-
parts in the, shape of, Venezuelan products were not forthcoming. This 
situation is giving rise to a great deal of concern in Venezuela's industrial 
circles, and creates obstacles to the concerting of trade agreements between 
the two countries, especially if such agreements would involve-prospects of 
y See Study of inter-Latin American trade. United Nations Publications, 




the substantial liberalization of commerce in manufactured goods« 
Establishment of a .joint commission 
17» With a view to the solution of border trade problems and the study of 
adequate formulae for the aggregate trade between Colombia and Venezuela, a 
joint commission was set up in 1959» Besides drawing up a schedule of 
possible trade items, this commission has recommended, inter alia, that the 
two countries1 development programmes be closely co-ordinated, and has 
suggested that the potential effects of Latin American multilateral agreements 
on their trade with each other and with the rest of the region be careful]^ 
analysed, 
18, As in the case of the 1959 agreements between Colombia and Ecuador, the 
studies that are being undertaken in the context of bilateral relations 
between Colombia and Venezuela reveal that interest is felt in economic 
co-operation and in integration at a level higher than their mere reciprocal 
trade. It seems, however, that final decisions could hardly be made without 
due reference to the degree of conviction entertained by public opinion -
especially in entrepreneurial circles - as to the possibility of participating 
in integration formulae which would facilitate the implementation of industrial 
expansion programmes, 
III. BETWEEN ECUADOR AND VENEZUELA 
19, A variety of circumstances - transport difficulties, in no small 
measure - have combined to keep trade between Ecuador and Venezuela at very 
low levels, although at the consultations on trade policy held in 1958 and 
1959 ^  the existence of interesting possibilities for a fairly substantial 
volume of trade was clearly evidenced. Moreover, it seems that Ecuador , 
would offer considerable inducements for the investment of Venezuelan capital. 
There is at present no treaty relating to trade between the two countries, 
nor is the most-favoured-nation clause applied. 
20, In consequence of the possibilities noted at the trade policy consult-
ations referred to above, Ecuador and Venezuela established a joint commission 
which met at Quito in February I960, and sketched out the bases for possible 
trade and economic co-operation treaties, including incentives t%> investment 
in the creation of industries producing for both markets. 






SUGGESTED GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF COLOMBIA, 
ECUADOR AND VENEZUELA IN THE LATIN AMERICAN MOVEMENT 
TOWARDS ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1* In Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela the idea of establishing close 
reciprocal co-operation in economic affairs is frequently mooted. The 
grounds on which it is based include, in addition to historical links 
and geographical proximity, the possibility of expediting the develop-
ment of the three countries through efficient utilization of their 
complementarity potential - both the natural possibilities relating to 
primary commodities produced in specific frontier areas, and those 
that would derive from the co-ordinated installation of certain industries. 
2, The concept of economic co-operation seemed on the way to materializa-
tion in August 1948* when the above-mentioned countries, together with 
Panama, signed the Quito Charter, by virtue of which the Greater-
Colombia Council (Conse.jo Grancolombiano) was constituted and operated 
/ 
in Caracas up to 1953. As the Charter was ratified only by Colombia 
and Ecuador, its provisions could not be put into force. 
This setback, which various factors helped to determine, up to a 
point reflected the apprehensions aroused by the Charter in certain 
circles connected with private enterprise. These motives of concern 
included the possible repercussions of the application of the instrument 
•n Venezuelan industry. The latter!s factory costs were higher as a 
rule than those registered in Colombia and Ecuador, because of the 
greater proportional influence of wages. It was feared that, if the 
customs union contemplated in the Quito Charter became a reality, the 
resultant free circulation of goods among the three countries would 
redound to the detriment of Venezuela's industrialization process. 
3. The Charter having been, in practice, repudiated, during the past 
decade trade among the three countries continued to be carried on through 
bilateral channels, and the only instruments successfully concerted with 




Colombia and Ecuador in relation to their reciprocal trade. Their 
long-standing agreement to grant each other most-favoured-nation treat-
ment and exemption from customs duties on specific products was amplified 
in 1959 by means of instruments whose entry into force is now pending 
their ratification by Colombia. 
Between Ecuador and Venezuela, whose reciprocal trade is insignificant, 
no treaty exists, and not even the most-favoured-nation clause is applied. 
Nor is there any trade treaty between Colombia and Venezuela, but the 
movement of goods between these two countries is considerable, although 
its levels fluctuate sharply; moreover, partly owing to the absence of , 
a trade agreement, a good deal of this traffic takes the form of smuggling# 
In this connexion it must be acknowledged that the complexity of the 
circumstances attending such "unregistered" trade makes the conclusion of 
instruments for its regularization a very difficult matter. It has thus 
long been surrounded by an atmosphere of uncertainty which is unquestion-
ably prejudicial to the economic sectors connected with Colombo-Venezuelan 
trade. 
4. At the.sessions of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)f 
the Greater-Colombia countries have given their support to recommendations 
that studies be carried'out on the expansion of inter-Latin American 
trade and the possibilities of establishing the regional market. 
In connexion vdth such studies, various meetings of groups of experts 
have been convened for the purpose of consultations on trade policy, in 
order to elucidate problems which, on account of geographical proximity 
or other causes, are common to several countries. These series of 
meetings were organized by the ECLA secretariat in 1958 and 1959 for 
the southern countries of South America on the one hand, and for the 
Greater-Colombia republics on the other. In February I960, the first 
of these two groups which was joined by Mexico in the final stage of 
its proceedings, signed the Montevideo Treaty, whereby the Latin American 
Free Trade Association is crfeated.^ The Greater-Colombia group, although 
1/ The Montevideo'Treaty was signed by Argentina3 Brazil, Chile, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay on 18 February I960. For its text, see 
"The Free-Trade Area", Economic Bulletin for Latin America. Vol. V,, 




useful light was shed on its problems during the Bogotá and Caracas 
2/ ' 
meetings,-7 has not yet reached the point of launching specific multi-
lateral measures, and has deemed it necessary to sponsor a third series 
of consultations, accepting the invitation of the Government of Ecuador 
to hold them in Quito. 
5. It is of interest to recall that at its first series of meetings 
(Bogotá, 13-18 November 1958), the group of Greater-Colombia experts 
advocated a solution of the multilateral type for their countries1 
reciprocal trade and industrial complementarity problems. It supported, 
in principle, the free-trade area formula as a transitional step towards 
3/ 
the desired long-term goal of a customs unionj** 
In the same context, various suggestions were formulated at this 
series of consultations with respect to the gradual paving of the way 
for multilateral economic co-operation. Although some of these suggestions 
were favourably received by the Governments concerned and certain aspects 
of them were subsequently taken into consideration by the Colombo-Venezuelan 
and Ecuadorian-Venezuelan joint commissions, it has become evident that 
misgivings similar to those that carried weight in the repudiation of 
the Quito Charter are still militating against the feasibility of a 
specific multilateral agreement among thte three countries. 
6. The establishment of the Latin American Free-Trade Association - which 
covers a major part of inter-Latin American trade relations - introduces a 
new element into the consideration of each country's individual policy 
vis-a-vis a possible multilateral treaty on intra-regional trade and 
economic co-operation. 
2/ See annex I below. For the summary records of the consultations held 
at Bogotá and Caracas, see documents E/CN.12/C.1/11 (pp. 15-41) and 
E/CN.12/C.1/11/Add.2. 
2/ According to the text of the summary record of the Bogotá meetings, it 
was pointed out that, at first, the free-trade area would cover trade 
relations and economic complementarity between Colombia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela, in view of those countries geographical proximity and 
certain characteristics and problems common to all of them, while 
provision would be made for the following two aspects as well: (a) 
the admission of any other country in the region which wished to take 
part on terms of full reciprocity; and (b) the correlation or ultimate 
merger of the area on the same reciprocal basis with others already 




Inevitably, the repercussions of the Montevideo Treaty will exert an 
ever-increasing influence on the overall trade relations of the Latin 
American countries. Moreover, it would not be surprising if public 
opinion on common market projects were to some extent swayed thereby, and 
not only the corresponding decisions but also the choice of methods for 
their implementation were facilitated. 
It should also be noted that, reconciling the rules inherent in a , 
Free-Trade Area with the characteristics of economies in process of 
industrialization, as theirs are, the signatories of the Montevideo Treaty 
- prompted by motives of concern similar to those existing among the 
Greater-Colombia countries - adopted in the instrument in question a system 
under which each party can exclude from the trade liberalization programme, 
in accordance with specific norms, particular lines of production that it 
wishes to continue protecting. Apart from this, as the Treaty is based on 
reciprocity of concessions and contemplates the conclusion of industrial 
complementarity agreements aimed at facilitating the production of capital 
goods, durable consumer manufactures and certain raw materials which call 
for high capital density and extensive areas of distribution, it opens up 
the possibility that the prices of the manufactured goods concerned may 
gradually become competitive in world market terms. 
7. In the course of the informal consultations held by the ECLA 
secretariat in connexion with the forthcoming Quito meetings, it was observed 
that governmental circles were greatly interested in making a thorough 
inquiry into whether such a formula as that of the Latin American Free-
Trade Association was a satisfactory means of channelling economic co-
operation and trade between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, either through 
the signature of an agreement similar to the Montevideo Treaty but confined, 
during a preliminary phase, to those three countries, or else by means of 
their individual accession to the Montevideo Treaty itself. 
In recent instruments, the Governments of the three countries have 
agreed to consult one another before taking up any definite position vis-a-
vis multilateral agreements signed in the Latin American region. 
8. During the above-mentioned informal consultations, the following were 




opinion of trade policy experts, given in their personal capacity: 
(a) Some consider that the Montevideo Treaty represents a satisfactory 
solution for the Greater-Colombia countries, since its inherent flexibility 
would afford them ways and means of settling questions of great concern to 
them, such as those relating to border trade, to the régime for countries 
at a relatively less advanced stage of economic development and to ' 
complementarity agreements; 
(b) Others think that the course of acceding to the Montevideo Treaty 
or to any other multilateral agreement - even one confined to the three 
Greater-Colombia countries -, while desirable in principle, would as yet be 
premature. According to this view, a better expedient for the time being 
would be to seek solutions for the problems connected with the expansion 
of trade among the Greater-Colombia countries, and with the broadening of 
their markets for certain lines of production, in bilateral agreements 
similar to that not long ago concluded between Colombia and Ecuador. It 
is recalled in this connexion that the latter country is studying the 
possibility of concerting a bilateral treaty with Venezuela; 
(c) Lastly, a third current of opinion, xvhile not denying recognition, 
in principle, to the possible value of multilateral treaties, given certain 
conditions, in relation to the acceleration and diversification of economic 
development, would nevertheless deem it preferable that attention should 
first be concentrated on the important practical problems of the three 
countries1 border trade, and that complementarity or integration prospects 
for specific branches of industrial production, especially the petro-
chemical industry, should be carefully explored. 
9« Ih official circles, questions such as the following were asked: 
(a) If Colombia and Ecuador were to accede to the Montevideo Treaty, 
together or separately, would they be able to maintain the exclusive treat-
ment* agreed upon between them, particularly that relating to the agricul-
tural commodities produced by Ecuador whose right of free entry into 
Colombia is established by the bilateral treaty in question? What would 
be the position of the tariff concessions instituted by the treaty between 
Chile and Ecuador? 
/(b) With regard 
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(b) With regard to the provisions of the Montevideo Treaty, could 
Ecuador, in order to attain the ends just referred to in connexion with 
the Colombo-Ecuadorian.agreement, invoke chapter VIII of the aforesaid 
instrument, as a country at a relatively less advanced stage of economic 
development? 
(c) In the event of Venezuela's acceding to the Montevideo Treaty, 
would the tariff concessions in force between that country and the 
United States be extended ipso facto to the signatories of the Treaty, 
with the majority of which Venezuela has at present no link in the 
shape of the most-favoured-nation clause? 
10« The subjects to which the foregoing questions al3_ude, and others to 
which reference will be made later, are allied to the régime of the most-
favoured-nation clause. The Montevideo Treaty established this clause 
in its most comprehensive form, as a besic principle of the relations 
among the signatories, with two reservations - those concerning border 
trade on the one hand, and, on the other, the special concessions 
temporarily granted by the Contracting Parties to countries at a 
relatively less advanced stage of economic development. 
At a later stage in the present report some considerations are 
formulated with respect to the practical significance of the most-
favoured-nation clause in a free-trade area, should the Greater-Colombia 
countries decide to create one. The conclusion to which these considerations 
lead is that Venezuela's exports would have access to those special 
customs régimes in force between Colombia and Ecuador which are not 
peculiar to border trade, and the exports of Colombia and Venezuela to 
the concessions deriving from the treaty between Chile and Ecuador. 
In turn, the customs treatment established for United States goods 
under the terms of the agreement in force between the latter country 
and Venezuela would be extended to the exports of Colombia and Ecuador. 
If, on the other hand, instead of creating a special free-trade area, the 
three countries were to decide upon accession to the Montevideo Treaty, 
the same extension of privileges would automatically come into effect 
for all the signatories of that instrument, in conformity with article 18 




Also at a later stage, a few points are raised in connexion with 
the scope of the provisions contained in chapter VIII of the Treaty, in 
so far as they authorize certain tariff concessions in favour of countries 
classified as being at a relatively less advanced stage of economic 
development, 
11, During the consultations, some sources in the Greater^Colombia 
countries expressed the view that if the States in question showed 
an inclination to accede to t he Montevideo Treaty, it might well happen 
that they could not do so simultaneously, since the trade policy problems 
with which .such a step would confront them are of differing scope. On 
the other hand, it would be desirable for the country or countries that 
could decide, to sign the Treaty to do so forthwith. By so proceeding, 
in their capacity as members of the Latin American Free Trade Association, 
they could avail themselves of its organs to help in seeking and applying 
the formulae that would have to be devised within the Association in 
order to facilitate the accession of the other Greater-Colombia countries. 
12, The forthcoming Quito consultations will undoubtedly provide a good 
opportunity for the objective study, in the light of comprehensive 
discussion, of topics as important as those referred to in the preceding 
paragraphs. With this end in view, to facilitate the elucidation of 
problems and in response to suggestions made during the recent informal 
consultations, the ECLA secretariat has compiled the background data 
sumn&rized in the present document and the annexes thereto* 
II. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS OR MULTILATERAL REGIME? 
13, The first question raised in this context may be summed up as 
follows: Is it more to the interest of the Greater-Colombia countries 
to continue to conduct their reciprocal relations at the level of bilateral 
trade agreements, or to channel them within a multilateral instrument? 
It is common knowledge that the growing world tendency to eliminate 
bilateral treaties is taking concrete shape through the system of 
multilateral customs agreements instituted by the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and other instruments. Such pacts include that 




the European Economic Community, the European Free-Trade Association, and, in 
Latin America, the free-trade area formed by five Central American countries 
the common market to which three belong^ and which a fourth is on the way 
to joining,^ and the free-trade area established by the Montevideo Treaty. 
1. Advantages of multilateralism 
14# Apart from the economic and political motives which may in each 
individual case prompt the concerting of multilateral treaties, these 
undoubtedly offer noteworthy practical advantages over the bilateral 
system from the angle of trade policy. The mere fact that the signatories 
are more than two in number improves the prospects for the diversification 
and sound expansion of trade. What is more, and most important of all, 
a multilateral treaty permits the establishment of incentives to more 
efficient utilization of the factors of production, thus helping the 
economies of the contracting parties gradually to reach a position in 
which they can provide employment for the factors in question at 
'satisfactory levels and on competitive terms. 
Again,- even if the directive and administrative organs of the 
multilateral instrument are not of a supra-national character, it would 
be a mistake to under-estimate the value of their intrinsic continuity 
and the consequent specialized knowledge of the permanent representatives 
and Secretariat officials as elements making for the successful conduct 
of the systematic work entailed in attaining the treaty's objectives. 
Among other arguments in favour of the multilateral system, it is 
worth while to point out that this method affords opportunities - such as 
bilateral treaties are unlikely to provide - for participating in agreements 
on complementarity by sectors of industry, and thus establishing in their 
national territory plants which could not operate in satisfactory economic 
conditions if they were dependent entirely upon domestic demand for support. 
Moreover, multilateralism makes it a feasible or a less arduous task to 
solve such problems as those of credit for the financing of exports 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 





and tHose deriving from international transport. Yet again, it enables 
common bases of negotiation to be prepared for the conclusion of trade 
or other agreements - such as can seldom result from isolated action - with 
third countries or groups of countries. 
Wor is it even extravagant to suppose that utilization of the resources 
of international financial institutions (the Inter-American Development 
Bank, for example) will be facilitated for parties to multilateral treaties 
through which complementarity agreements can be put into effect, since in 
the financing of the latter such resources could be turned to highly 
'advantageous account. 
2. Relation between the success of the instrument and the 
number of member countries 
15. Under a multilateral instrument, as has already been pointed out, 
the wider diversity of production affords a broader margin for trade, 
facilitating tariff negotiations and the fulfilment of the obligations 
inherent in the .treaty concerned. 
In the case of the Greater-Colombia countries, this view is confirmed 
by a glance at the composition of the reciprocal trade between Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela and that of the trade they maintain with the 
signatories of the Montevideo Treaty.-^ 
III. CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO THE EFFECTS OF A POSSIBLE 
MULTILATERAL TREATY ON EXISTING SITUATIONS 
1. Main characteristics of agreements in force 
(a) Colombia 
16. The only bilateral agreement on tariff concessions that Colombia has 
in force is the one it signed with Ecuador in 1942, supplemented by the 
additional convention of 1943. 
17. The 1942 agreement establishes the most-favoured-nation clause in 
respect of customs, lifts taxation on goods in transit and exempts specific 
products of each party from import duties in Colombia and Ecuador, Excluded 




from the most-favoured-nation treatment are the advantages accorded 
to adjacent countries in connexion with border trade, or those resulting 
from customs unions, 
(a) The following are the Colombian products which enter Ecuador 
duty-free: woollen and printed cotton fabrics, pharmaceutical specifics, 
chemical products, glass and chinaware, iron and steel manufactures, 
leather goods, perfumery and other toilet articles, tin containers and 
•crown caps, agricultural machinery, farm utensils, cigarettes, cigars 
and leaf tobacco, 
(b) The following are the Ecuadorian products exempted from duties: 
rice, barley, wheat, sugar, cacao, beans, lentils, animal wool and woollen 
and cotton yarns, cotton textiles, woollen suitings, cement, petrol, coal 
gas, dry ice, plaster, butter, fresh fruit, meat (in brine, salted or in 
the form of jerked beef) and tagua wood manufactures« 
18. The tariff treatment instituted by the 1942 Colombo-Ecuadorian pact 
is exclusive in character, as agreed between the parties in view of their 
position as adjacent countries and regarded as justifiable und'er the 
meaning of international resolutions such as that of the Seventh Inter-
American Conference (no. 80) dated 24 December 1933* and that adopted 
by the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee on 
18 September 1941. In practice, this exclusive regime has exerted little 
influence on trade between the two countries, since the treaty contains 
provisions under which quantitative restrictions in respect of the 
negotiated products can be and actually have been applied to remedy 
balance-of-payments disequilibria and for other reasons. Again, from 
another point of view, the exclusive nature of the régime has had no 
major repercussions on the trade of Colombia and Ecuador with third 
countries. It must be remembered in this connexion that a substantial 
proportion of Colombo-Ecuadorian trade is carried on across the land 
frontier and for the principal purpose of supplying areas remote from 
the coast, so that competition from other sources of supply is difficult 




Attention mast here be called to the fact that in 1945 the Government 
of the United States agreed not to claim the benefits of the special 
tariff treatment conceded by Colombia to Ecuador.^ 
19. The 1959 treaty between Colombia and Ecuador was drawn up in order 
to replace that of 1942 by another on broader lines. Under the new treaty, 
a number of Ecuador's agricultural products would enter Colombia duty-free, 
a circumstance which would facilitate the development of temperate-zone 
farming in the Andean regions of Ecuador, thanks to the prospects of 
capital investment on the part of both countries. The counterpart items 
are mainly Colombian manufactures, on which the import duties imposed 
by Ecuador are reduced or eliminated altogether. 
20. Besides the agreement with Ecuador, within Latin America, the most-
favoured-nation clause is in force between Colombia and Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil and Chile. It should be noted that three of these countries are 
signatories of the Montevideo Treaty, while the fourth - Bolivia - which 
took part in the negotiating of that instrument, is studying the possibility 
of acceding to it.^ Colombia has also signed an agreement with Uruguay, 
not yet ratified,, whereby mbst-favoured-nation treatment is established 
as between the two countries. In all these agreements, the clause in 
question is unconditional, except that in the case of Argentina, Brazil 
and Chile the benefits accorded to adjacent countries to facilitate 
border trade are excluded from its effects. Also excluded under the 
agreements with Argentina and Brazil are the concessions deriving from 
participation in customs unions or free-trade areas. 
In the rest of the World, the countries to which Colombia extends the 
benefits of the most-favoured-nation clause are Belgium, Canada,^^ Denmark, 
8/ See Study of inter-Latin American trade» op.cit., p. 98 and footnote 102» 
2/ A Protocol extended by the signatories of the Montevideo Treaty grants 
Bolivia a moratorium expiring on 31 December I960, during which it is 
free to accede to the instrument in question on an equal footing as 
a signatory State. 
10/ Trade relations between Colombia and Canada are governed by the treaty 




France, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg,—9 the Netherlands., Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Briatin and Northern 
Ireland and the United States, Of these agreements, only three - those 
signed with Hungary, Italy and Norway - exclude from the treatment 
stipulated by the clause the special concessions relating to border 
trade and those obtained through membership of customs unions or free-trade-
areas . 
21. Colombia also maintains a customs co-operation agreement with Peru, 
which is in force for trade in certain frontier areas« It establishes a 
common customs tariff applicable to a large number of articles, as well 
as regulations - also in common - for the collection of the duties 
affecting the many goods specifically indicated in the agreement. The 
most-favoured-nation clause is not in force between Colombia and Peru. 
22. The Colombian National Federation of Coffee-Growers (Federación 
Nacional de Cafeteros), with the authorization of the Banco de la República, 
has concluded private agreements with governmental foreign trade 
institutions in Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Romania, the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. These pacts- virtually barter agreements -
aim at promoting exports of Colombian coffee in exchange for goods from 
the other parties. A similar agreement has been signed with Israel, 
(b) Ecuador 
23. Chile and Ecuador, already linked by a tariff treaty signed in 1949, 
concluded, another in 1957* This institutes the most-favoured-nation clause, 
with the following exceptions: special treatment accorded to adjacent 
countries; advantages extended by Ecuador under the terms of the Quito 
Charter; concessions deriving from the participation of Chile or Ecuador 
in multilateral agreements to which the other State is not a party; and . 
benefits granted within a customs union or free-trade area. 
24. The 1957 treaty lifts tariff duties on Chile's imports of bananas, 
pineapples, peanuts, alkaloids and their components, certain oilseeds, 
printed books, balsa wood, corozo in the piece, and "Panama" hats. 
11/ The most-favoured-nation clause in the agreement with the Netherlands 
is applied by extension to Luxembourg. 
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Ecuador in turn exempts the following Chilean products from duties? 
hulled or unhulled oats, fresh fruit (grapes, sweet and Moreilo cherries 
and apples), printed books and periodicals, sodium and potassium nitrate 
and copper sulphate. Chile reduces the duties on cacao and coffee beans, 
castor oil and raw rubber; in compensation. Ecuador grants concessions 
in respect of copper wire or bars, pipes and tubes, plums and raisins, 
plywood, dynamite and mine fuses, chick-peas and vermouth. 
So far only Ecuador has ratified the 1957 treaty« 
25 c The bilateral agreements with Chile and Colombia are the only tx^ o 
tariff instruments in force between Ecuador and other Latin American 
countries. As regards the rest of the world, the most-favoured-nation 
clause is established in Ecuador's trade treaties with Canada, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Norway, Spain? Switzerland 
and Yugoslaviao With two exceptions - the agreements with the Federal 
Republic of Germany and with Italy - these treaties exclude from the 
effects of the clause concessions deriving from membership of customs 
unions or free-trade areas, as well as those granted to adjacent States 
and those originating in the Quito Charter. The agreement with France 
also stipulates that the clause shall not cover the privileges conceded 
by Ecuador to Colombian shipping considered as national under Ecuadorian 
law (Flota Mercante Grancolombiana) and to goods transported in such 
vessels* 
(c) Venezuela 
26. Venezuela has granted tariff concessions only in the agreement 
concluded with the United States in 1939 and modified in 1952. It also 
maintains the most-favoured-nation clause with Bolivia, Brazil and 
El Salvador among the Latin American countries, and Belgium, Canada, 
Italy, the Netherlands,^^ Spain and the United Kingdom in the rest of 
the world. Only the agreements signed with Canada and the United States 
make any mention of the saving clause relating to participation in customs 
unions or free-trade areas. The modus vivendi with Canada excludes in 
additipn the preferences granted by Venezuela to Colombia, Ecuador and 
Panama, 
12/ The application' of the most - favoured « nation clause to the Netherlands 
. . is conditional» 
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27. The concessions extended by Venezuela under the bilateral agreement 
with the United States have lost some of their practical significance 
since mid-1959, when quantitative restrictions were established. 
2, The negotiations mechanism of the Montevideo Treaty 
28. Discussion of what might be the effect on their ext.ant agreements 
of the Greater-Colombia countries1 possible accession to the Montevideo 
Treaty may usefully be preceded by a brief indication of the most 
important aspects of the negotiations mechanism of the said Treaty. 
29o The basic commitment assumed by the signatories of the Montevideo 
Treaty consists in the elimination of existing duties, charges and 
restrictions on trade items which represent: 
(a) Substantially their imports from the other members of 
the Area, at an average annual rate of elimination of 8 per cent. The 
concessions resulting from the fulfilment of this obligation are to be 
specified in the National Schedule of the country concerned5 and 
(b) Substantially all the aggregate trade of all the member 
countries. In respect of this obligation no annual commitment is 
established, but each country is to proceed as suits its own convenience, 
provided that duties on the products in question have been totally 
eliminated by the time a period of 12 years has expired0 
30. Presumably the member countries, by means of the pertinent 
negotiations, will promote the inclusion on the National Schedules of 
commodities which have not yet played a part in their trade. While this 
is a highly desirable course, and failure to follow it would be out of 
line with the aims of the Treaty, it must be pointed out that there is 
no specific engagement to expand trade by the addition of new items, 
at least in so far as this is not indispensable for the fulfilment of 
the collective obligations set forth in articles 4 (b) and 7 of the 
instrument. 
31o When a country wishes to obtain preferences which will enable it to 
promote the exportation of products not previously included in its trade, 
13/ In principle, "substantially all" is understood to mean a proportion 
of about 80 per cent of total trade (or total imports, as the case 




it will, submit to one or more of the other States members an application 
for the extension of the concessions it needs. Through the negotiations 
conducted to that end, the counterpart concessions to be granted by 
the country taking the initiative will be established. The benefits 
thus agreed upon are applicable to all the members of the Free-Trade 
Area without compensation during an initial phase. 
32. Only at first are the concessions to be extended gratuitously, for 
when, thanks to the advantages thereby obtained, a third country begins 
to develop a steady flow of exports, the countries by whose concessions 
it is benefiting will be entitled to request application of the clauses 
of the Treaty bearing on the principle of reciprocity. These clauses 
provide for subsequent negotiations, on the basis of which the countries 
developing their exports mil in turn grant concessions designed to 
facilitate the establishment of new export lines on the part of the 
other members of the Free-Trade Area. 
33» It has already been stated that the firm and immediate commitment 
assumed by every member country consists in the reduction of duties 
and the relaxation of restrictions on the products comprising substantially 
all its imports from the Area. In practice, the scope of this commitment 
is limited. It should be recalled in this connexion that, in general 
terms, existing trade is carried on under the auspices of exemptions or 
preferences established in bilateral agreements or granted unilaterally. 
That is, in many instances compliance with the commitment will be 
facilitated by the consolidation of special treatments which have long 
been applied. Moreover, such existing trade does not usually compete 
with the domestic activity of the States concerned, since it involves 
as a rule commodities that are not produced in the importer countries. 
A case in point is that of the exchange of certain temperate-climate 
products for other from the tropics. 
34» The other commitment assumed by the signatories of the Montevideo 
Treaty is, as has already been said, that of eliminating duties, charges 
and restrictions in respect of the products that represent substantially 
all the aggregate trade of the Area. These will net necessarily be the 




G each individual country. In the first place, each member State's own 
exports of course form part of the aggregate trade of the Area. Thus, 
each country will also be under the obligation to eliminate duties 
and restrictions affecting imports of goods of which it is a traditional 
exporter. This would apply, for example, to copper and nitrate in the 
case of Chile, or coffee and bananas in that of Brazil. Secondly, it 
seems unlikely that the composition of each country's imports will 
coincide with that of the aggregate trade of all the States members. 
Inevitably, therefore, it will happen that trade in certain products 
has to be liberalized despite the fact that they do not habitually 
appear among a given countryTs imports. Such commodities will be 
included in the Common Schedule for which the Treaty provides. In their 
case no commitment to effect a specific annual reduction exists. Each 
country has 12 years in which to adept the necessary measures. It is 
thus free to distribute the reductions over this period in such a way 
as not to jeopardize existing situations and to promote the wise 
reorientation of certain production processes that might find themselves 
in some danger from external competition by the end of the said 12-year 
period. 
35o The Treaty contemplates an additional mechanism designed to encourage 
and facilitate the elimination of duties and restrictions and, therefore, 
the expansion of trade: namely, that deriving from, complementarity 
agreements by industrial sectors. Through these, and basically by virtue 
of understanding between representatives of the interested economic circles 
in each country, the liberalization of trade in the products of the 
industrial sector concerned can be planned along such lines that the 
consequent broadening of markets will stimulate the installation or 
consolidation of given industrial activities, allow the requisite 
investment programmes to be drawn up and enable enterprises to attain 
the dimensions most recommendable from the economic point of view. 
36. To sum up, the objectives of the Montevideo Treaty comprise not 
only the elimination of duties, charges and restrictions which hamper 
existing trade but also the expansion of that trade by the incorporation 
of products itfhich it does not at present include; all of which is to be 
achieved through negotiations based on the principle of reciprocity. 
/3. Effects on 
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3* Effects on specific agreements 
(a) Agreement between Colombia and Ecuador 
37» As previously stated, various precise questions have been formulated 
as to how the exclusive tariff treatment compacted between Colombia and 
Ecuador would be influenced by the possible accession of one or both 
of these countries to the Montevideo Treaty. 
The questions relate to aspects which merit careful consideration, 
for the treatment referred to covers important lines of agricultural 
production on the side of Colombia's purchases from Ecuador arid a number 
of manufactures on that of Ecuador's impox-ho from Colombia. 
Several motives of concern present themselves in this connexion. 
Apparently, if at the time of joining the Free-Trade Association Colombia 
were to extend the treatment in question to the other members, its 
subsequent capacity for negotiation with them might be weakened, inasmuch 
as it would have authorized before hand the duty-free entry of agricultural 
commodities whose admission to its territory might otherwise have provided 
a basis for the negotiating of counterpart concessions in favour of 
Colombian products. In the case of Ecuador, apart from other repercussions, 
something similar might happen in respect of certain manufactured goods 
included on the exclusive-treatment schedule negotiated with Colombia, 
if this treatment were automatically incorporated into the Area's 
multilateral régime. 
To facilitate the study of these probleuis at the forthcoming Quito 
meetings, various questions have been formulated, as was mentioned earlier, 
in the introduction to the present report. These questions are reproduced 
below, followed by a few preliminary explanations which may prove helpful 
in the discussions that will take place. 
/(i) Automatic transmission 
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(i) Automatic transmission of concessions. 
First questions Would the tariff concessions 
established in the Iriost recent treaty between 
Colombia and Ecuador have to be automatically 
transmitted to the other signatories of the 
Moribevideo Treaty, or could this jxvoceecling be 
modified on the grounds that the regime ccncerned 
is peculiar border trade? 
38. Under article 18 of the Treaty, the transmission of concessions is 
automatic. Consequently, when a country accedes to the Treaty it extends 
to the other signatories all the most-favoured-nation or exclusive 
treatments which it has accorded up to that date in respcct of .imported 
goods and services entering its territory, and in return its own goods 
and services benefit by the preferential treatments in force for imports 
into the territories of the other members of the Area. The bilateral 
agreements from which such preferences emanate remain operative, although 
in practice, of course, the real effects of the treatments in question 
vary in scope ipso facto« and they may or may not be adjusted by means 
of renegotiation, 
39* Although, as stated above, most-favoured-ration and exclusive 
treatments in force between pairs of signatories are automatically 
extended to the other members of the Area, it seems hardly likely that, 
in accordance with the mechanism of the Treaty, the concessions thus 
introduced will be taken into account at first in calculating the 
fulfilment by each member of the obligation to reduce customs duties on 
imports from the Area at an average annual rate of 8 per cent. It would 
be incumbent on the organs of the Treaty to determine, in due course, 
whether the computation indicated in paragraph 41 would be justifiable 
at a later date. 
40. There are some pairs of signatories of the Treaty which at present 
grant each other certain exclusive treatments of a bilateral character. 
One possibility would be to denounce simultaneously all the agreements 
from which these preferences derive. This done, the exclusive treatments 
would be renegotiated with a view to their renewal or adjustment on a 
multilateral basis within the Area, and could then be taken into account 
in the calculations relating to the tariff reduction commitment established 
by the Treaty. 
41. Whether or not this possibility materializes, the subsequent computation 




depend upon the decision reached the States of the Area, prior to the 
tariff negotiations, as to the interpretation of the term "duties in force" 
to be adopted for the purposes of the negotiations in question.-^ It 
would not be surprising if the extension of an exclusive treatment to the 
other members of the Area were to be included in the calculations when it 
implied an effective preference visJa-vis other suppliers, and this was 
made clear during the negotiations conducted in conformity with articles 11 
and 14 (a) of the Treaty (the latter in so far as it relates to the principle 
of reciprocity). 
42. It would seem that the trade between Colombia and Ecuador to which the 
exclusive treatment stipulated in their treaty relates, although carried 
on by overland routes, cannot easily be covered by the definition of "border 
trade" to secure its exclusion from the régime of the Montevideo Treaty, 
especially if it is taken into consideration that article XVII of the 
Colnmbo-Ecmdorxan agreement already contains, a highly restrictive definition. 
The signatories of the Montevideo Treaty have not yet made any exact 
pronouncement on the concept of "border trade". Possibly a definition may 
bo reached by negotiation. If the concept were to prove broad enough to 
permit the exclusion of significant trade flows, the country thereby enabled 
to maintain a specific trade movement outside the Montevideo Treaty might 
in return find itself injured to an extent equalling or exceeding the 
benefits it enjoyed, if owing to the latitude of the definition it were 
cut off from exclusive treatments in other sectors of the Area. 
(ii) Automatic counterparts 
Second question; What would be the most important 
concessions that might be automatically extended 
to Colombia and Ecuador? 
43• Argentina buys its coffee supplies - about 37,000 torn yearly, with an 
approximate value of 35 million dollars » entirely from Brazil. Brazilian 
coffee is exempted from the 20-per-cent exchange surcharge on the c.i.f. 
price which is in force in Argentina for coffee from other sources. It 
would appear that this benefit will be extended to coffee imported by 
Argentina from any other country in the Area. 
44. The case of the same product in Chile may now be considered. This 
country applies. a substantial reduction — larger than those it has compacted 
14/ See Antecedentes para una definición de lo que debe entenderse por 





under the GATT and with Ecuador - to duties and charges on coffee from 
any country with which it maintains the most-favcxired-nation clause. The 
reduction derives partly from an agreement with Brazil, under the terms 
of which Chile lowers the ad valorem duty to 8.5 per cent instead of the 
30 per cent generally levied; and partly from a unilateral decision by the 
Government of Chile, by virtue of which, in order to prevent modifications 
of the exchange rate from raising the internal price of coffee, this commodity 
is exempted from the specific duty of 0.35 sixpenny gold pesos per kilogramme 
15/ of gross weight,-^ 
15/ Under the 1937 treaty bot*®©» Cuba and Chile, the latter country agreed 
not to apply to import© of Cuban coffee customs duties or other internal 
taxes, charges or dues exceeding, the lowest in force at the date of 
signature of the said treaty. These minimum charges consisted of a 
specific duty of 0.35 sixpenny gold pesos per gross kilogramme and 
a n ad valorem duty, which affected a considerable number of articles 
and amounted to 3*5 per cent of the c.i.f. value, plus 5 per cent 
of the value of the goods after they had entered the country. The same 
treatment accorded to Cuban coffee was extended by Chile to other 
countries through the operation of the most-favoured-nation clause. 
Subsequently, the ad valorem duty rose, in general, to 30 per cent, 
without in practice affecting the treatment negotiated for coffee. 
When the Chilean-Cuban treaty of 1937 was•superseded by that of 
1952, the concession in favour of Cuban coffee - and consequently of 
coffee from other countries enjoying the same benefit by virtue of the 
most-favoured-nation clause - was suppressed. To obviate the difficulties 
that would be created in respect of imports of Brazilian coffee by the 
withdrawal of the concession and the automatic increase in the ad 
valorem duty, Chile, through an exchange of notes in May 1952, maintained 
the treatment originally granted to Cuban coffee under the 1937 
agreement in favour of Brazilian coffee, and therefore, of coffee 
imports from the other countries with which it had compacted the most-
favoured-nation clause. 
Furthermore, Chile negotiated the specific duty on coffee within 
the GATT - reducing it to 0.25 gold pesos -, although not the 30-per-cent 
ad valorem duty. In the 1957 treaty between Chile and Ecuador the 
former grants the latter country treatment equivalent to that negotiated 
within the GATT. But by virtue of the raost-favoured-nation clause, 
Chile applies both to Ecuadorian and to Colombian coffee the.lower 
duties agreed upon with Brazil. By its own unilateral decision, Chile 
freed coffee imports from the specific duty in 1959> while continuing 
to apply the 8.5 ad valorem duty payable by Brazil. 
/45. With the 
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45. With the entry into operation of the Montevideo Treaty, the same 
treatment as at present would be extended by Chile to coffee from any 
country in the Free-Trade Area, and in respect of non-member countries 
would presumably be withdrawn. This would mean that apart from leaving 
the necessary margin between intra-area tariffs and those applied, to the 
rest of the world, the importer country would reckon the difference in 
tariff levels as part of the reduction commitment inherent in the Treaty. 
At the same time, its capacity for negotiation with Brazil would be 
strengthened, einoo tho margin might imply a substantial concession in 
that country's favour, which it would compensate with a similar benefit. 
Thus, again on the basis of general principles, in the future Chile might 
well grant coffee from countries outside the Area the treatment negotiated 
within the GATT, which is identical with that contemplated in the 1957 
treaty between Chile and Ecuador. 
46, It is worth while noting that the automatic extension of exclusive 
concessions - whether in the case of coffee or in that of any other trade 
item - does not mean that the enjoyment of such advantages will ultimately 
be gratuitous. The root principle of the Montevideo Treaty is that of 
reciprocity. Consequently, any marked disequilibrium in the magnitude 
of the benefits under discussion leads to negotiations designed to 
compensate them, on the basis of the steady improvement of trade levels. 
This implies that compensation will not be sought through the withdrawal 
of concessions, but rather by the intensification of those a3.ready granted 
or the incorporation of new trade items into the liberalization régime. 
(iii) Discriminatory exchange measures 
Third question: Do discriminatory exchange 
practices exist which might nullify or reduce 
the value of the concessions granted through 
the mechanism of the free-trade area? 
47» Most-favoured-nation treatment within the Free-Trade Area and relating 
to the elimination of duties, charges and restrictions is also explicitly 
extended to the exchange régime. The risk suggested in the question is 
therefore non-existent. 
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(iv) Classification of Ecuador as a country at a relatively less 
advanced stage of economic development 
Fourth question! In the event of Ecuador's accession 
tç the Montevideo freaty. it would seem reasonable to 
Pl^ gcp fy that country, in accordance with the opinion 
of certain experts consulted» as one at a relatively less 
advanced stage of development, for the purposes of chapter 
VIII of the Treaty, In that case, what prospects would be 
opened UP for the discovery of a formula that would exempt 
from the régime of the Treaty the exclusive treatment 
granted each other by Colombia and Ecuador? 
If the signatories of the Treaty agreed that Ecuador was entitled 
to invoke the provisions of chapter VIII, there would be several directions 
in which the formula referred to in the question might be sought. In any 
case it would be necessary for Ecuador and Colombia - if such a decision 
were reached - to make a prior study of the possible formula or alternative 
formulae which to that end they would submit to the Contracting Parties 
of the Montevideo Treaty for their consideration. 
Such alternatives might be: 
(a) To leave in force the treatment at present established in the 
bilateral treaty between Colombia and Ecuador, but to exclude from the 
effecte of the Area's most-favoured-nation clatise the provisions relating 
to Ecuador's exports to Colombia; or 
(b) To leave in force only the latter treatment, on a unilateral 
and exclusive basis; or 
(c) To bring the treatment into line with such other benefits as 
Ecuador's exports to the rest of the Area might enjoy as a result of the 
application of chapter VIII of the Montevideo Treaty, 
49« As regards the first of these alternatives, it should be recalled 
that a considerable proportion, of the Colombo-Ecuadorian exclusive 
treatment covers supplies for specific districts in the interior of the 
two countries. Given transport costs and other factors, it seems 
unlikely that competition on the part of similar goods from other 
countries - even if they were granted the same customs treatment - would 
have any significant restrictive repercussions on trade between Colombia 




by the Colombo-Ecuadorian exclusive treatment, however, competition from 
similar merchandise of foreign origin would exert a much stronger influence 
if the concessions in point were extended multilaterally within the 
Fre e-Trade Area. 
If the second alternative were chosen, Colombia would receive no 
compensation for the favourable treatment it accorded to Ecuador, but 
its capacity for negotiation with the other countries of the area would 
remain intact. 
In the third case, the bases for the readjustment would be established 
as a result of the ad hoc negotiations conducted by the competent organs 
of the Latin American Free-Trade Association. 
50. The selection of one of the foregoing procedures, or of any other, 
would unquestionably be contingent upon the findings that emerged from 
each country1s study of the repercussions of the possible formulae on 
the movement of the products in which it trades. 
(b) Treaty between Chile and Ecuador 
51. Of the three Greater-Colombia countries, only Ecuador is a party to 
an agreement on customs treatment for specific goods with a signatory of 
the Montevideo Treaty.- This agreement is the one it signed with Chile 
in 1957^The.-accession of; Chile 'to the Montevideo Treaty - and; if the 
case should arise 9 the participation of ,.Ecuador in a free-trade area to 
which -Chile does not-.belong - will undoubtedly reduce the relative: value 
of-the treatments bilaterally agreed upon beti^ een the two countries, 
since presumably-the products 'concerned, will :nct be .covered by the 
liberalization effected in the .other area. ... It must be remembered that 
under the Chilean-Ecuadorian agreement, treatments deriving from customs 
unions orfrée-trade areas of which the contracting parties are members 
are excluded from the effects of :the ;most^ favoured-»nation clause, 
(c) Treaty between the United 1 Stat es .and Venezuela : . 
52.- This treaty contains the saving-clause relating to customs unions 
and free-trade areas. At the present,time, for reasons which include the 
protection of domestic industry, Venezuela has quantitative restrictions 
• ' ' ' " > /in force 
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in force that limit the entry of various goods for which -ttee agreement 
established a specific customs treatment. It is understood that this 
instrument is shortly to be renegotiated with a view to its improvement. 
53. If Venezuela were, to accede to the Montevideo Treaty, in regard to 
the provisions of the latter the situation would seem to be as follows: 
(i) The most-favoured-nation clause would become a basic principle 
of Venezuela's relations with the other signatories of the Treaty; 
(ii) The tariff concessions accorded by Venezuela to the United 
States would bo automatically extended to the Contracting Parties of the 
Montevideo Treaty, but with respect to the goods currently subject to 
quantitative restrictions, the practical significance of this extension 
would depend upon the characteristics of the import licence system. The 
contribution it represented could be counted in Venezuela's favour in 
the calculation of that country1s annual reduction of import duties, 
charges and restrictions.on goods from within the Free-Trade Area» 
(ni) The automatic extension of concessions would not be gratuitous, 
since, in observance of the. principle of reciprocity, the establishment 
of equitable compensations would be negotiated if perceptible disequilibria 
were noted in the magnitude of the resulting benefits. 
4. Wage levels in Venezuelan industry 
54* When in 1958 the bases for a possible broad Latin American common 
market were projected for the first time, it was thought that the reduction 
and elimination of duties - to be effected gradually and on a basis of 
averages - might be made extensive to all the goods scheduled in the 
customs tariff, whether they were or were not currently traded among 
the member countries. One of the reactions to wiach the draft bases 
gave rise in Venezuela from the outlet related to the difficulty it 
would find in competing in the market, owing to its high industrial wage 
levels, relatively superior to those of other countries in monetary 
terms. It was then suggested that,as a measure making for equity, Venezuela 
might be accorded some form of special treatment (for example, a rate of 
reduction of duties lower than the general percentage fixed for the other 
members). 
/55. The Montevideo 
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55. The Montevideo Treaty entirely alters the situation. It stipulates 
the reduction and elimination of duties, not in respect of all the goods 
on the customs tariff, but only for those included in the signatories1 
reciprocal trade or incorporated into it by means of negotiations, and 
up to the point at which the magnitude of such reductions and eliminations 
is equivalent to substantially all the value of that, trade ("substantially 
all" being estimated for these purposes at approximately eighty per,cent 
of the total). This system would leave each country room to reserve for 
its own industry the opportunity of meeting domestic requirements in 
lines of production where it felt that customs protection should be 
maintained or established - especially since the interests of practically 
all the Contracting Parties of the.Treaty would probably coincide as 
regards excluding from the liberalization procedure the goods produced 
by primary activities for whose output the domestic market is commonly 
reserved. 
Nevertheless, as some of Venezuela's representative figures have 
clearly perceived the Treaty may open up what are perhaps unparalleled 
opportunities for the expansion of Venezuelan industry. The prospect 
of being able to rely on the support of so great a demand as the Free-
Trade Area will afford in sectors whose development entails heavy investment 
and a high level of mechanization - with the corresponding reduction of 
the proportion of factory costs represented by wages - would undoubtedly 
facilitate the implementation of national programmes for.the installation 
of such manufacturing activities as aluminium making, iron and steel- • 
and specific branches of the petrochemical industries. It is easy to 
imagine the impetus that accession to the Montevideo Treaty would give to 
some of these industries - for example, those producing artificial textile 
fibres, synthetic rubber and certain plastic raw materials, in all #f which 
/lines it 
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lines it seems very unlikely that wage levels would affect the intra-
Area competitive capacity of the exports concerned.^/ 
Moreover, each individual Contracting Party will presumably abstain 
from negotiating exports or imports of a particular manufacture if it 
lacks competitive capacity or if the result would be ruinous competition 
for similar domestic products, unless the sacrifice were offset by 
advantages obtained in favour of other goods. 
56. There is another aspect to which attention must be drawn. Apparently 
the Montevideo Treaty does not exclude the possibility of negotiating, 
within the framework of the complementarity agreements by industrial 
sectors for which it provides, the establishment of special terms for 
the reduction or elimination of duties, when the entry into operation 
of such agreements needs to be realistically adapted to the situation 
of the signatories. Such terms might consist, inter alia in temporarily 
granting a particular country special treatment - for instance, a more 
rapid rate of reduction of duties - for exports of the goods covered by 
the complementarity agreement to which the country concerned is a party. 
5• Trade in petroleum products 
57* The possibility of Venezuela's joining the Latin American Free-Trade 
Association calls for a somewhat detailed study of the situations that 
might arise within the Association in connexion with trade in petroleum 
and petroleum products, which account for .one fifth of total inter-Latin 
American trade. 
16/ The report on water resources in Venezuela prepared by the ECLA 
secretariat (at present in preliminary draft form) shows that the 
productivity of that country's manufacturing industry notably improved 
between 1950 and 1959, rising from a level lower than the average for 
the Venezuelan economy as a whole (excluding the extractive industries) 
to 37 per cent higher by the end of the period cited. It is worth 
noting that during the same years the agricultural sector also 
registered a significant increase in productivity in absolute terms. 
To judge from these developments, provided that such trends in 
manufacturing and agriculture are maintained, the problem of the 
incidence of high wages on comparative costs would seem to be taking 





As is well-known, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay are major 
purchasers of petroleum, of which they buy substantial quantities from 
Venezuela, If the latter acceded to the Montevideo Treaty, its importance 
as a supplier of petroleum would have certain implications for the fulfilment 
of the liberalization programme at which the Treaty aims. The inclusion 
of hydrocarbons in the programme would be inevitablei While at the moment 
petroleum products might be excluded from the Common Schedule contemplated 
in the Treaty, on the grounds that they represent barely 2 per cent of 
the aggregate trade of the seven signatories, the accession of Venezuela 
without the inclusion of petroleum would mean that it was impossible to 
draw up a schedule of goods whose value amounted to that of substantially 
all trade, 
58. The inclusion of petroleum on the Common Schedule, as well as on 
the National Schedules of habitual importers, would ipso facto facilitate, 
as far as the latter were concerned, the implementation of the liberalization 
programme• Given the volume of trade in petroleum, its computation would 
reduce the relative importance of the other products eligible for inclusion 
on the Common Schedule, and many of them might be relegated to a marginal 
status. Thus, in their case the application of the programme would not 
be compulsory, 
59. Crude petroleum is already exempt from duties in Brazil and to all 
intents and purposes in Argentina, so that the twc leading importer 
countries would be able to meet a considerable proportion of their 
liberalization commitment simply by consolidating existing treatments. 
The situation would be different in Chile and Uruguay, The former levies 
a specific duty of 5.7 dollars per ton, plus an additional 20-per-cent 
ad valorem duty which does not seem to be applied. Uruguay imposes a 
specific tax and a supplementary ad valorem duty calculated on a certain 
official base value (valor de aforo) which together total about 3.18 
dollars per ton of crude. In both instances, the elimination of duties 
might result in a special treatment favouring Venezuela. 
/60, Again, the 
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60, Again* the situation with respect to crude differs from that of 
petroleum derivatives. In the four countries mentioned, imports of 
petrol and kerosene, as well as those of fuel oil, diesel oil and 
lubricants, are subject to various duties and charges (see table l). 
Consequently, the benefits which liberalization would entail for Venezuela 
17/ 
might be o£ some practical significance.—^ 
61. The value of liberalization for Venezuela is modified, however, by 
a circumstance deriving from the characteristics of trade in petroleum. 
In mary countries imports are in practice effected solely by State trading 
agencies - such as the National Department of Fuels, Alcohol and Cement 
(Administración Nacional de Combustibles, Alcohol y Portland - ANCAP) in 
Uruguay - or by these agencies and a few big international enterprises. 
The purchasing policy of such firms and agencies may not be so strongly 
influenced by customs preferences as by other considerations, in its 
decisions on sources of supply. Nevertheless, it must be recalled in 
this connexion that the enterprises referred to generally have subsidiaries 
in Venezuela* so that the commercial effects of the special treatment 
accorded to petroleum within the Free-Trade Area might benefit that 
country considerably. 
As regards the petroleum bought by State agencies, it would remain 
to be seen whether the hope of obtaining certain concessions for the sale 
of goods in Venezuela might channel such purchases in that countryTs 
direction. Apart from this, although the Montevideo Treaty makes no express 
12/ The commitment to eliminate duties affects only those which have no 
equivalent in the shape of a tax applicable to the similar domestic 
product. In the case of petroleum derivatives such a situation 
often arises, although as a rule the tax on the domestic commodity 
is lower than the duty on the imported article, as is the case in 
Brazil. Thus, only that part of the import duty which was in 





TREATMENT ACCORDED TO IMPORTS OP PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN SELECTED 
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cost (percentage) 
Chile 
Speolflo duty unit 
Speolflo duty 
GATT 
Ad valorem duty (percentage) 
GATT (peroentage) 
Supplementary duty (peroentage) 
Prior deposit (percentage) 
Uruguay e/ 
Speolflo duty unit 
Speolflo duty 
Ad valorem duty (peroentage) 
Official base value (aforo) 














































Gross tons Gross tons 100 litres 100 litres Tons 
4.0 1.8 0.36 I.38 O.89 
84.8 84.8 25.3 20.2 45.5 
14.0 10.5 1.29 3.5I 4.21 
a/ The present table shows specific duties and the official base value (aforo) calculated In terms of dollars, 
b/ For purposes of the application of the single duty, thé o.l.f. value in dollars is converted Into oruzelros 
at the exchange rate in foroe for imports of these products (100 oruzelros to the dollar at present), not at 
the offlolal exchange rate, which Is the one used for conversion purposes in the case of other imports, and , 
at the moment Is 1Ô0 cruzeiros to the dollar. Consequently, the effeotlve import duty on the c.l.f. oost In 
dollars, expressed in terms wMoh permit comparison with the duty applied to other Imports, works out at 
only 55«^ per oent of the latter. Imports of all these produots are effected outside the auction system, at a 
favourable or subsidized exchange rate (100 oruzelros to the dollar at present), as established in the 
Customs Tariff Act (Ley de Tarifa Aduanera), article 50, paragraphs 1 and 2, and to the amounts determined 
annual3y in the foreign exchange budget. Any Imports in excess of such amounts would have to be effected 
within the pertinent speolal category. Imports of these products are exempt from the 5**p0r-oent oustoms 
clearance tax. 
0/ The disembarkation charge of 30 gold pesos per ton Is Included In the speolflo duty. 
d/ The first of the two figures given indicates the ad valorem duty on the value of the goods when formalities 
have been completed. The second represents the equivalent duty estlmted on the basis of the o.l.f. value, 
e/ The National Départaient of Fuels, Aloohol and Cement (Admlnlstraclln Naolonal de Combustibles, Alcohol y 
Portland - ANCAP) holds the monopoly of imports of petroleun and derivatives, vhlch It brings in duty-free* 




stipulations with respect to official trade transactions, the Contracting 
Parties will presumably seek to conduct them in such a way as not to 
restrict trade in products covered by the liberalization programme. Should 
import restrictions result from State trading, they would have to be 
gradually eliminated in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty. 
62. Lastly, it must be borne in mind that the current structure of inter-
Latin American trade may undergo sweeping changes in consequence of the 
development of petroleum production in various countries, such as 
Argentina and Bolivia, for instance. In a few years1 time, some of the 
latter may well become exporters of substantial volumes, for the sale 
of which they may seek guarantees through the mechanisms of the Free-Trade 
Area. 
IV. OTHER ASPECTS 
63- Brief mention will now be made of other subjects that aroused 
interest during the informal consultations preparatory to the Quito 
meetings. 
1. Exceptions in the most-favoured-nation clauses compacted 
with third countries 
64« Membership of a free-trade area implies the need for the implicit 
or express introduction of the corresponding exception into any most-
favoured-nation régime that may have been established in agreements 
with third countries. If the latter were to withhold their consent 
to the exception, the other possible procedure would be to revise the 
agreement concerned after verifying whether spacific commodities 
habitually imported from countries outside the area really were 
adversely affected. This might apply to the pacts concluded with 
third countries by Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Since these States 
are not members of the GATT, they are not covered by the automatic 
exception accorded to its Contracting Parties when they form a free-trade 
area under its regulations. 
However, it is reasonably likely that if the Greater-Colombia 
countries create or join a free-trade area they will be able to secure 




in question observes the rules laid down by the GATT. Moreover, the 
problem is solved beforehand in the case of some treaties by virtue 
of the saving clauses they contain. 
2. Customs negotiations between organs of two 
multilateral treaties 
65. If a special free-trade area were established by the three Greater-
Colombia countries, could this area, through its organs, conduct tariff 
negotiations with the Contracting Parties of the Montevideo Treaty? 
As both associations would be based on the formula of the free-
trade area, neither, would unify or standardize the external tariff 
of its members, who would therefore have to negotiate individually with 
the States members of the other area, since group negotiations would 
not be practicable. 
3# Accession of one and the same country to two 
multilateral treaties 
66. Could a country be a member of two free-trade areas at the same time? 
It is hard to see how, unless in each area it was granted the corresponding 
exception to most-favoured-nation treatment in respect of the concessions 
concerted in the other area. This is a case not contemplated in the 
Montevideo Treaty, and should obviously be the object of negotiation when 
occasion arises. 
4* Deposit of the instrument of accession 
67* The requisite for the entry into force of the Montevideo Treaty is* 
that the pertinent instrument of ratification be deposited by not fewer 
than three of the signatories. The Treaty comes into force 30 days after 
the third such instrument has been deposited. Meanwhile, Latin American 
countries that have not signed the Treaty can become contracting parties 
by depositing an instrument of accession. This becomes fully effective 
30 days from the date of deposit, since accession constitutes a final 
act in itself. Therefore, if the formal accession of the country concernec 
has to be approved by Parliament, the necessary sanction must be obtained 





SOME POSSIBILITIES FOR TRADE AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION BETWEEN 
COLOMBIA, ECUADOR AND VENEZUELA 
During the consultations on trade policy held at Bogota and Caracas 
in November 1958 and May 1959* one of the points that emerged was the 
desirability of a thorough investigation of the possibilities for trade 
and economic co-operation apparently existing or expedient in respect 
of the following items: 
1. Agricultural sector 
Long-staple rotton, Exports from Ecuador to Colombia and Venezuela. 
Investment of joint capital in the first of these countries to promote 
the development of cotton-growing; 
Malted barley. Supplies from Ecuador for Colombian breweries situated 
near the Ecuadorian frontier. Exports from both Ecuador and Colombia 
to Venezuela; 
Cattle and meat. Furtherance of Venezuela's cattle development programme 
on the basis of improved breeds from Colombia and Ecuador. Exports of 
meat and of cattle on the hoof for slaughter from Colombia to Venezuela; 
Sheep, vicunas, alpacas, etc. Exports of Ecuadorian wool to Colombia, 
Development of sheep farming in Ecuador on the basis of joint Colombian-
Ecuadorian investment; 
Dairy products. Imports of Ecuadorian produce into Colombia and Venezuela; 
Wheat. Supplies of Ecuadorian wheat for Colombia and Venezuela; 
Maize seed. Exports to Ecuador and Venezuela of Colombia's hybrid types 
for tropical and temperate climates, and of the soft and hard Ecuadorian 
types to Colombia; 
Potato seed. Exports of certain special Colombian varieties to Venezuela; 
Light tobacco. Supplies from Venezuela for the tobacco industry in Colombia 
and Ecuador; 
Calf-hide. Exports from Ecuador to Venezuela; 
Fish meal. Exports to Colombia from Ecuador 
Banana flour. A possible collective agreement to develop the industrial 




to the production of flour and balanced animal feeds for all three countries; 
Tinned fish. Understanding between Colombia and Venezuela on the use of 
Colombian oil and containers in the processing of tinned fish in Venezuela 
for consumption in Colombia; 
Wool* Manufacture of Colombian plywood for Ecuador and exports of balsa 
wood from the latter country to Colombia and Venezuela; 
Coal. Exports from Colombia to Ecuador; 
Rice. Exports from Ecuador to Venezuela, as long as the latter9s rice 
production deficit lasts. 
2t Textile industry 
Possibilities in this field would be limited by the circumstance that 
the textile industry, while relatively advanced, is at different stages in 
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. However, it became apparent t^ hat as all 
lines of production are not yet covered, a desirable step would be to 
formulate a joint programme for the three countries aimed at selective 
production to supply the Greater-Colombia area. This complementarity 
programme would be based on a special customs regime. 
In the textile branch, Venezuela would import from within the area 
fine yarn, rayon fibres, absorbent cotton and hygienic woven goods, and 
would export to it synthetic resins for the manufacture of artificial 
textiles and yarns. 
3. Chemical industry ' 
In this sector, and especially in the petrochemical industry, it 
would be expedient to conclude certain agreements for the purpose of 
combining lines of production and markets and exchanging technological 
data and experience. The possibility of concerting such agreements ie 
strengthened by the fact that, broadly speaking, the national, projects 
concerned are at the programming stage or only just being put into execu-
tion. Specialization seems particularly necessary in such lines as 
plastic raw materials and synthetic rubber. 
Venezuela would export urea and ammonium nitrate to Ecuador, as well 
as powdered resin for the manufacture of polyethylene sheets. 
A * Iran 
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4» Iron and steel industry 
In its initial phase, complementarity might relate to the following 
items: coke for steel making, tubes for the petroleum industry, flat 
products, metal structures, tinplate, drop-forging on thick plate, tractors 
and farm implements. 
5. Guidelinestfor sectoral complementarity 
At the informal consultative meetings it was recommended that in the 
study of the bases for possible complementarity in the above-mentioned 
sectors, attention should be devoted to such aspects as the following: 
(a) Problems deriving from the differences in the proportion of 
industrial costs represented by wages in the three countries; 
(b) Effects of the joint demand of the Greater-Colombia area on the 
unit costs of production; 
. (c) A common policy with respect to private investment; 
(d) Trade - especially customs - policy required to encourage the 
conclusion of complementarity agreements; 
. (e) Accession of other Latin American countries to such agreements; 
(f) Co-operation on the part of representatives of private industry; 
and 
(g) Expansion of trade with the rest of Latin America. 
6. Economic complementarity 
One of the recommendations formulated at the Caracas meetings was 
that an agreement on technical co-operation should be concluded between 
the programming agencies of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, with a view 
to the joint drafting of development policy as well as to collaboration 
with the trade policy committees that would be set up by each of the three 
countries and whose main objective would be the promotion of their recipro-
cal trade relations. 
To attain these ends, the three programming agencies would co-operate 
in the following activities: 
(a) The study of economic development projects for border zones; 
(b) The formulation of production programmes whose implementation at 




(c) The exchange of information on technical assistance requirements, 
with a view to supplementing the assistance received and giving 
preference to the utilization of national experts; and 
(d) Reciprocal transmission of regular progress reports on their 
technical research and oh any projects which may be of common 
interest. 
To facilitate the fulfilment of the agreement* the three agencies 
would set up a common subsidiary body - the Tecnical Secretariat for 
Co-operation between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. The secretariat 
of the Economic Commission for Latin America was requested to collaborate 
in the organization and operation of the technical secretariat contemplated 





GREATER-COLOMBIA COUNTRIES« TRADE WITH ONE ANOTHER AND WITH THE 
SIGNATORIES OF THE MONTEVIDEO TREATY 
1* Trade among the Greater-Colombia countries is concerned almost in 
its entirety with foodstuffs, which account for about 65 per cent of their 
aggregate trade. With the exception of chemical and pharmaceutical products, 
the goods traded do not represent identical lines of production. On the 
contrary, a considerable degree of complementarity characterizes the 
reciprocal trade in question, Fuels and other petroleum products are 
exported from Venezuela to Colombia and Ecuador; from Ecuador, rice to 
Venezuela and cacao, sugar, cereals and dry pulses to Colombia; cotton 
textiles, agricultural machinery and chemical products from Colombia to 
Ecuador; and from Colombia to Venezuela, sesame, milling machines for 
grinding maize or mincing meat, and livestock, 
2, A comparative study of the composition of the imports effected by 
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela shows that whereas the goods they import 
from one another are mainly foodstuffs, a large proportion of their imports 
from the Free-Trade Area consists of raw materials, intermediate products 
and capital goods (see table 2). Venezuela, however, is still an importer 
of foodstuffs even in relation to the signatories of the Montevideo Treaty. 
3» As regards the tariff regime applied to the products traded among the 
Greater-Colombia countries, Colombia's basic imports - cacao, sugar, cereals 
and pulses - are subject to the special treatment granted under the terms 
of the trade agreements signed by Colombia and Ecuador in 1942 and 1959* 
Chemical products, cotton textiles, agricultural machinery and certain 
kinds of machinery and tools that Ecuador purchases from Colombia are also 
covered by the same preferential customs regime. As regards Venezuela, 
only one item of any importance in its trade with Colombia - milling-
machines for grinding corn or mincing meat - was negotiated in the agree-
ment with the United States, Rice, on the other hand, which in 1957-58 
accounted for over 60 per cent of the total value of Venezuela's purchases 
from the Greater-Colombia area, cannot be imported unless a permit is 
obtained in advance. 




cent is represented by goods - greasy wool, raw cotton, chemical products -
which are duty-free under the -terms of the trade agreement with Ecuador. 
If Colombia extended this regime tq the members of the Free-Trade Area 
through the most-favoured-nation clause, apart from the consequent reduc-
tion in the relative importance of the preferential treatment granted to 
Ecuador, the Ecuadorian products covered by the concessions might find 
themselves having to compete with similar articles from other countries 
in the Area. 
What is more, the automatic extension of the aforementioned treatment 
to the Area might affect Colombia's capacity to negotiate within the Latin 
American Free-Trade Association, since the list of goods to which the 
concessions relate is a very long one. 
Over 40 per cent of Venezuela's purchases from the Area corresponds 
to products negotiated in the agreement with the United States, outstanding 
among these being foodstuffs, certain chemical products and copper wire 
and cables. It must be noted, however, that an appreciable number of the 
articles in question - especially those of agricultural origin and some 
raw materials - are subject to the prior permit requirement in Venezuela, 
It seems, then, that the effects of extension to the Area of the treatment 
applied to the United States would be limited in so far as the tariff con-




TRADE OF THE GREATER-COLOMBIA COUNTRIES WITH ONE ANOTHER AND 
VITH THE CONTRACTING PARTIES OF THE MONTEVIDEO TREATY I 
ANNUAL AVERAGE, 1357-58 
(C.l+f« Import values» In thousands of dollars) 
' • V ir" • • I- • 
Imports from one another Imports from the Grand Commodity Colon* Soua* Von£ Total Free-Trade Area total bla dor zuela Golem«» Eeua Vene _ . -"" Total bla dor zuela 
Live a»imals (eluding fish, 
* «45 M70 crustacea and molluscs) 50 50 ¡331 520 
Products of the fishing industry I 1 U5 «•5 46 
Chaese 1+ 1* 1 5^7 548 552 
Hul;ad rice 1 626 1 626 1 626 
Sesame 113 113 113 
0.1 Ives 8 8 8 
C^ oo?iuts of copra 37 37 37 
Ccvoals, pulsus and vegetables ft»» 9 723 739 798 1 521 
Bii^eed, rape, millet, pure or blended 33 39 39 
T3.nr.ed and prepared foods 3 3 507 507 510 
Unbilled cats ? 9 9 
Hullod oats i»95 495 U95 
Su^ E.r and confectionery 1 386 1 386 1 386 
Fre^ h fruit (grapes, apples, pearsJquinccs,oto») ' * 93 2 273 2 366 2 366 
Rai.sins 7 7 7 
Walnuts, unshelled 9 9 9 Bre r.il nuts and similar products 3 9 9 
Popper 16 16 16 
Cacao and coooa preparations 4 614 it 614 4 614 
Tomato purie 3 3 3 
Wheat 10 10 10 
Dry foddar 75 75 75 
Poult t/ "ggs 123 123 123 
Crud* -ce^ etable x-.-ax 23 23 23 
eztxects, essences and preparations 8 6 11 11 19 
Tanned skins and hides ? 9 3 759 762 771 Urrc&iined skins Ufi US 46 
Wool, horsehair and bristles 7 7 701 21 722 729 
Pure woollen textiles 4 k 39 39 >0 
Stravr 36 36 7 7 43 Quebracho extracts 5U0 51*0 5Uo 
Tanning and dyeing extracts 105 51 156 156 
rait 137 137 137 
Wine 59 15 7* 7H Raw cotton 772 >*9 ill 932 932 Cotton textiles »0 43 
Wool (greasy, washed, bleached or dyed) 19 49 Wool vaste 7 7 7 
/Table 2 (cont.) 
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Table 2 (oontinued 2) 
Imports from one another Imports from the 
Colon Eoua Vene Free-Trade Area Grand 
Ccranodily d o7 tUelI Col« Eom Vene T o t a l total 
b i a dor z u e l a 
Combed yarns, mercerized or not 
Artificial silk thread 
White pine and pltoh pine simply sawn 
Wood, s i m p l y «awn 
Wood, planed or tongued and grooved 
Unspecified soft wood manufactures 
Pharmaceutical apeolfios 
Chemical and pharmaceutical products 70 ?5 
Biological products other than or@Lnlo serum 
Cement 
Ravhlde and leather manufactures 
Tallow and tallow manufactures 
Unspeoifled artificial plastic manufactures 
Navigable oraft 
Silver manufactures 
Minted gold or gold bars or Ingots weighing 
not lees than. 12 kilogrammes 
Industrial preparations 
a) for sizing fabrics -
b) for «leaning boilers 
Fertilisers 
a} natural and vegetable 
b) chemical 
BKW materials for plaiting and carving and 
other raw materials and unprocessed 
products of vegetable origin 
Non-edible essential oils 
Natural asphalts 
Edible oils 
Mineral fuels 530 
Tar oils and their components 
Light petroleum products 
Aluminium collapsible tubes with screw caps 
Crown caps 
Paper and board 
Printed bodes and graphic art products 
Iron, eastings and steel 50 
Unspecified iron or steel tubings, 
coupling, stopcocks, joints 
Iron and steel bars 
Iron and rteel bars, grooved, structural, 




57 97 97 
5 5 5 
9 9 9 
7 7 7 
39 39 39 
31 31 31 
42 42 226 226 268 
165 17k 59 2 » 526 651 
14 14 138 138 152 
26 26 26 
6 6 1»3 43 
15 23 38 38 
21 21 13 13 34 
h7 47 47 
1 1 1M5 146 
251 251 10 10 261 
7 7 7 
5 5 5 
105 109 214 2*4 
112 112 112 
35 35 35 
6 6 6 
3 3 
46 35 35 81 
7k ¿58 k 662 736 
530 530 
10 10 10 
162 162 162 
162 162 162 
3 9 39 39 
111 165 165 
1 5 1 6 7 
50 693 693 743 
1 1 1 390 1 390 1 391 
285 285 285 
630 630 630 
/Table 2 (cont#) 
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Table 2 (continued 3) 




zuela Total Colon bla" 
Free-Trade Area 




Unspecified iron and steel manufactures 48 48 48 
Copper 13 82 82 
Copper bars and wire, coated or unco&ted, 
wrought, etc« 609 609 609 
Cinematographic reels 185 185 185 
Unspeoifled Instruments for arts and orafts 25 25 25 
Cork manufactures 122 122 122 
Passenger ears, motor-cycles, bicycles and 
other vehicles U 9 119 119 
Ob jets d'art and oollectors* items 3 3 3 
Sanitary apparatus and appliances 2 2 111 111 11f> 
Unspecified devloes for the protection cf workers 187 187 187 
Milling-machines and appliances for grinding 
198 I98 199 corn or mincing meat 1 1 
fock ing-ma ch lnes 49 49 
Threshers and she llers 41 41 41 
Cooking-stoves, water-heaters, ovens 197 197 197 
Boilers, maohlnery, mechanical apparatus and 
Instruments and spard parts 97 97 69 69 166 
Maohine-tools weighing from 100 to over 
5 000 kilogrammes 15 15 15 
Machine-tools weighing frcm 10 to over 
5 000 kilogrammes 102 102 1 1 103 
Electrical machinery and apparatus and artioles 
for use in electrical engineering, and 
spare parts 21 21 21 
Raw asbestos 2 2 2 
Nonwtietalllc ores 22 22 19 94 113 135 
Salt, sulphur, earths and stones, lime 106 105 I06 
Optle&l, measuring and preolsion Instruments 
and apparatus, and other unspeoifled 
Instruments and apparatus 3 3 3 
Chemical preparations and other produots for 
olnematograpliy and photography 109 109 105 
Natural and artificial barium sulphate 13 13 13 
Hemp, Jute and manllla cables, rope and cord 11 11 11 
Fishing-nets 40 4o 4o 
Ceramic produots 25 25 25 
Glass for construction 15 15 15 
Glass and glass manufactures 27 27 2 7 
Railway sleepers 23 23 23 
Crude lead 21 7 51 79 79 
Iron or steel spring? 57 57 57 Springs for vehicles ¿2 62 62 
Medical and surgical instruments 5 5 5 
Other commodities 34 
Total commodities 7 727 43o 2 55.2 10 726 3 717 2 021 11 497 17 235 27 961 
Grand total 7 732 720 2 690 11 142 3 750 2 578 14 847 21 175 32 317 





THE TRADE POLICY OF VENEZUELA-^ 
1. In order to facilitate studies on the adaptation or readjustment of 
its trade policy which would be entailed by Venezuela's immediate or 
subsequent accession to multilateral agreements such as the Montevideo 
Treaties or others designed to promote inter^Latin American trade expansion 
and economic co-operation, the characteristics ahd orientation Venezuela's 
contractual regime in respect of trade are briefly reviewed below. : 
A. TRADE AGREEMENTS 
1, The overall picture 
2. In comparison with other Latin American countries, Venezuela is a 
party to relatively few trade agreements (see table 3)- The treaties 
signed by this country can be classified in two groups which correspond 
to different stages of its economic development. 
The first comprises the traditional friendship, trade and navigation 
agreements whose clauses, without establishing customs reductions or exemp-
tions for specific goods, relate to the import and export régime and stipu-
late the treatment to be accorded to natural and juridical persons, 
diplomatic and consular agents, and shipping. This group includes - to 
mention only the treaties in force today - those signed with Belgium (1884), 
Bolivia (1883), El Salvador (1883), Italy (1861), Spain (1882) and the United 
Kingdom (1834), as well as the 1920 agreement re-establishing diplomatic 
2/ relations with the Netherlands.-' 
Some of these long-standing treaties currently in force, like others 
3/ 
which have ceased to be applied in recent yearsf* have, by virtue of 
their most-favoured-nation clause, effectively influenced the placing of 
goods in Venezuela. The reason is that in this country the substantial 
1/ See Study of inter-Latin American trade, op.cit.» pp. 96-102, for a 
report on Colombia's trade policy. The ECLA secretariat has another 
study in preparation on the trade policy of Ecuador. 
2/ The most-favoured-nation treatment extended to the Netherlands is 
conditional. 
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Agreed exceptions to the clause 
Border Customs G:?eater« 
trade union or Colombia 
free-trade countries 
area 






1 and 3 Canada 
18 and 20 SI Salvador 
8 Italy 
3 Netherlands 
4, 6 and 11 Spain 
4 United Kingdom 
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2 % 10.1834 
28.8.1952 
Souroet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Convenios comerciales suscritos por la República de Venezuela que otorgan 
el tratamiento de nación mrfs favorecida y permaneoen en vigencia, Caracas, 
a/ Including Panama. 
b/ The relevant provision is inserted in the text of the note outlining the modus vivendi» 
c/ Formalized by an exchange of notes between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela and the dlplomatlo 




inflow of foreign exchange accruing from petroleum exports has enabled 
imports to be maintained at a high level for many years, much less drastic 
restrictive or selective measures having been imposed than in countries 
beset by chronic baltece-of-payments difficulties. 
" Thus, while under agreements to which other Latin American countries 
are parties, the most-favoured-nation clause has often lost a good deal 
of its customs significance through the operation of the permits system, 
quotas, bans, differential exchange rates and other foreign trade controls, 
in Venezuela it has retained in greater measure its character as a factor 
positively facilitating the sale of the products it covers. This is 
evindenced by the fact that European countries, under the aegis of the 
clause, have succeeded in appreciably increasing their relative contribu-
tion to Venezuela's supplies of certain goods which benefit by specific 
reduction.under the agreement between that country and the United States, 
Conversely, there are some Latin American countries which, because the 
agreement to apply the clause is no longer in force, have witnessed a 
proportional decrease in their exports to Venezuela in so far as these 
consist of items covered, by the agreement between Venezuela and the 
United States. Nevertheless, the significance of the clause for 
Venezuela's imports have declined to some extent, since a short time 
ago the process of economic diversification, among other factors, induced 
* 
the country to increase import restrictions and extend them to various 
products, in particular manufactured goods. When these restrictions 
affect commodities included in the agreement with the United States, 
they are likewise applicable in respect of countries supplying similar 
goods to the Venezuelan market. 
3. Venezuela's second group of agreements is very snail, and belongs 
to the period in which the Venezuelan econony was switching over from 
agriculture to mining. The rapid changes introduced into the structure 
of exports by this metamorphosis and the position of absolute predominance 
attained by hydrocarbons turned Venezuela's traditional trade policy into 
new channels. 
The agreements belonging to this group are aimed mainly at guarantee-




establishes reductions and consolidations of customs duties on specific 
imported goods, i.e., the treaty between Venezuela and the United States, 
which in practice constitutes, the axis of Venezuela's trade policy. The 
other extant instruments in this group are two modus vivendi with countries 
that are important to Venezuela for the sale of its petroleum - Brazil and 
Canada. ^ 
4. In its trade policy, Venezuela holds aloof from the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), apparently because of the peculiar structure 
of its trade. About 95 per cent of Venezuela's exports consists of 
petroleum products; and about three quarters of the total volume of 
these are purchased by countries with which Venezuela maintains bilateral 
agreements that embody a most-favoured-nation clause and thus ensure it 
non-discriminatory treatment in the markets concerned. It would seem 
that the authorities responsible for Venezuela's trade policy doubted 
whether the new or greater concessions - transmissible to all the 
Contracting Parties of the GATT - which Venezuela would secure for its 
petroleum would more or less counterbalance the extension of the reduc-
tions and consolidations compacted with the United States to all the 
GATT countries and the new benefits it would have to grant them. The 
size of Venezuela's importer market, and the freedom hitherto character-
izing the exchange régime on the basis of which it operates, clearly have 
something to do with these misgivings. Such considerations seem to have 
carried weight when in 1952 the agreement signed by Venezuela and the 
United States in 1939 was revised outside the GATT, However, circumstances 
which seriously affected the balance of payments and the liquidity of the 
banking system, and which mainly resulted from an abnormal drain on the 
means of external payment, compelled the Government to institute foreign 
exchange controls in November i960. 
An analysis of the causes which determined the application of these 
measures would be out of place here. But were they to persist, the out-





2. The agreement with the United States 
5. In the United States the Venezuelan petroleum industry has a large 
market close at hand, which absorbs more than half of Venezuela's total 
exports. For its heavy fuel oil, in particular, there is a strong demand 
in power stations, mines, foundries and many other industries in the States 
along the North Atlantic seaboard, where domestic producers of coal and 
petroleum often advocate restriction of the flow of supplies from abroad. 
Under the 1939 bilateral agreement, the United States granted Venezuela 
a substantial reduction of petroleum import duties, but only on a quantity 
not exceeding 5 per cent of the crude refined in the United States during 
the fiscal year preceding that in which the imports were effected. Under 
the terms of the 1943 treaty between Mexico and the United States, this 
tariff quota was abolished for imports from the former country* By 
virtue of the most-favoured-nation clause, the same concession was then 
extended to Venezuela. The treatment thus established lasted until the 
agreement between Mexico and the United States was denounced in 1950. 
Its expiration brought the tariff quota back into force, making it almost 
inevitable that Venezuela's exports to the United States would be subject 
to restriction, since in that year they already exceeded the stipulated 5 
per cent of the crude handled by the United States refineries. Thus it 
was that in 1951 more than half the exports in question were unable to 
benefit by the reduction contemplated in the 1939 agreement because they 
were in excess of the quota, and on the surplus the whole of the tariff 
duty had to be paid, 
6. When the agreement with the United States was revised in 1952, the 
quota system was eliminated. Under the régime agreed upon for United 
States imports, duties.were payable according to the gravity of the 
petroleum (A.P.I, grades). The lowest duty corresponded to heavy products, 
which constitute about 45 per cent of Venezuela's output of crude.^ 
7. For certain derivatives - petrol and other engine fuels, lubricants 
and some paraffin products -, the 1952 revision established a treatment 
y The duty is 1/8 of a cent per gallon (5*5 cents per barrel) on petroleum 
of less than 25 A.P.I, grades. On that of 25 A.P.I, grades over or ever, t. 




similar to that already negotiated by the United States for the same items 
within the GATT, The importance of its inclusion in the 1952 instrument 
seems to derive from the fact that both Contracting Parties are empowered 
(article XVII) to terminate any part of the agreement at 30 days notice. 
If'- to take a purely hypothetical case - such a decision were adopted 
in respect of the most-favoured-nation clause, the insertion referred to 
would safeguard the continuance of the above-mentioned tariff treatment 
for the Venezuelan products concerned. 
8. As regards coffee, cacao and iron ore, the instrument consolidates 
exemption from customs duties.in the United States, where these commodities, 
whatever their source, are not subject to tariff duties. In this connexion, 
consolidation forestalls the effects of a possible change in the régime as 
a whole. 
9. Despite the elimination of the tariff quota (see paragraph 6 above), 
the 1952 agreement accords the United States - and, reciprocally, Venezuela, 
as far as its imports from the United States are concerned - the right to 
suspend and sometimes withdraw a customs concession, when its application 
is substantially detrimental to similar goods of domestic origin. The 
motive underlying this provision is much the same as in the case of the 
saving clauses incorporated in the GATT Charter. 
10. The counterpart granted by Venezuela in return for the United States 
customs concessions may now be considered. The United States supplies 
about two thirds of Venezuela's total imports, which in 1959 amounted 
to an aggregate value of approximately 1,400 million dollars. Roughly 
half of these imports from the United States consists of goods benefiting 
by the concessions. 
The customs concessions granted by Venezuela as a result of the 1952 
readjustment, in the shape of reductions and, above all, consolidations, 
at present cover goods classified under 176 items, including machinery 
and equipment, raw materials and a considerable number of manufactured 
goods and foodstuffs. 
11. The 1952 instrument introduced into the schedules, reductions and 
consolidations comprised in that of 1939 a series of modifications designed 
to encourage the diversification of the Venezyelan economy. But the 




for readjustments. In this connexion, the aforesaid selective and restric-
tive measures recently adopted by Venezuela are symptomatic* Under the 
guise of an extension of the permit system, these measures affect a variety 
of foodstuffs, .as well as other goods such as cigarettes, some alcoholic 
beverages, cables and wire (coated and uncoated), specific electrical 
appliances for household use and certain types of motor vehicles for which 
assembly plants exist in Venezuela. 
12. Again, it is worth recalling that as early as 1957 the United States 
had begun to apply a programme of voluntary restrictions on imports of 
crude petroleum and derivatives. These restrictions became compulsory 
in the course of 1959. They would seem to originate mainly in the steadily 
increasing disparity between production costs in the United States and in 
other countriés, in the consequent expansion of the former country's 
imports and in the effect of this on the domestic petroleum industry. 
The restrictions are a motive of serious concern in Venezuela* since its 
5/ 
petroleum exports are extremely dependent upon the United States market.^ 
13. Lastly, it should be pointed out that the appropriate authorities in 
the two countries are known to be in touch for the purpose of furthering 
studies conducive to the revision of the 1952 agreement. 
3. Intey-Làtin American policy 
14. Broadly speaking, in comparison with that of other countries Venezuela's 
contractual activity with respect to Latin America has been slight. Hitherto 
it has taken virtually no steps to concert trade agreements. 
The background data which probably account for Venezuela's attitude 
are complex. Firstly, various Latin American countries offer an attractive 
and growing market for the sale of petroleum products. But in no case do 
they extend a discriminatory customs régime to the imports concerned, the 
evolution of which is conditioned largely by such factors as the quotation 
of competitive sellers' prices and also, in the case of crude, the field 
of specialization of the refineries where it will be distilled. Consequently 
¡J See "Economic developments in Venezuela in the 1950's", Economic 
Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. V, No, 1 (Santiago, Chile, March 
I960), pp. 21-61, 
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any reduction or elimination in the customs treatment obtained by Venezuela 
within Latin America would be automatically transmitted to other supplier 
countries, unless it were incorporated in the framework of a free-trade 
asea or customs union, 
15. In Venezuela, moreover, neither the Government nor private enterprise 
seems convinced of the usefulness of systematically concluding agreements 
to supply Latin American countries with petroleum, the implementation of 
which might, and in the case of maty of the applications submitted to 
Venezuela in this connexion actually would, mean that the latter was 
obliged to accept as a counterpart Latin American goods whose prices 
might be higher than world market quotations and had to put up with the 
temporary freezing of resources which clearing operations entailed. 
16. Nevertheless, in the course of the last 15 years Venezuela has made 
a limited number of arrangements to barter petroleum - usually a part of 
the Government royalty consisting of 16.75 per cent of total production 
of crude - against other commodities from certain South American countries. 
17. At the present time there are no data available on the real prospects 
which the negotiation of Venezuelan petroleum royalties in Latin America 
would offer, even if the corresponding operations were liquidated in actual 
dollars, as Venezuela would prefer, in view of the basic importance of 
petroleum for its balance of payments. To shed some light on the prospects 
in question, it would be useful to relate the volume represented by such 
royalties - classified by tjrpes of crude, according to A.P.I, grades -
to the requirements of each importer country, the products in which its 
refineries specialize and the composition of the demand concerned. 
4. The most-favoured-nation clause 
18. The extant agreements which establish most-favoured-nation treatment 
as between Venezuela and other Latin American countries are very few -
only three - in number. Apart from the long-standing treaties still 
in force with Bolivia and El Salvador (countries whose trade with Venezuela, 
for geographical and other reasons, is on a very small scale), Venezuela 
maintains the most-favoured-nation clause only with Brazil. 
This fact, and the abolition of the most-favoured-nation régime 




form some idea of the real significance of the extension of the regime 
in relation to the development of trade between Venezuela and other Latin 
American countries. 
(a) The modus vivendi with Brazil 
19» The modus vivendi with Brazil has been long in existence, for it 
dates from 1940, notwithstanding the precarious juridical character of 
an instrument which has to be renewed every year by means of an exchange 
of notes. Intrinsically, this modus vivendi simply represents the 
establishment of a most-favoured-nation clause. 
In the world scale, Brazil holds fourth place among the purchasers 
Of Venezuelan petroleum, while it comes first among Latin American buyers.^-
The corresponding exports to Brazil are subject to the general non-
discriminatory treatment which this country, like those of Latin America 
as a whole, accords to hydrocarbons. Under this general regime crude 
petroleum is a duty-free product, 
20. The fact that the modus vivendi extends to Brazilian goods the same 
customs treatment that Venezuela grants to the United States has hitherto 
had few positive repercussions. There are several reasons for this. The 
treatment in question benefits various foodstuffs produced in the temperate 
zone, of which Brazil is not an exporter. Again, there is the problem of 
transport. Despite the relative geographical proximity of Brazil and 
Venezuela, their seaports are linked by few direct maritime freight 
services. The only way to obviate long waiting periods is to resort 
to transshipments, which considerably raise freight costs. Another 
reason why so little advantage is taken of the opportunities which the 
modus vivendi seems to offer for the sale of various Brazilian manufactures 
is to be found In the lack of commercial organizations, such as exist in 
the case of the traditional markets, for the purpose of promoting and 
facilitating the operations concerned. However, both the public sector 
6/ In 1953 Venezuela's experts of petroleum to Brazil accounted for almost 
6 per cent of its total world sales of this commodity. In the same 
year, Brazil's purchases amounted to one third of the total quantity 




and private enterprise are making son® effort to exploit these possibilities 
in gradually increasing measure. 
(b) The modus vivendi with Chile 
21. This modus vivendi. which had been in force since 1941, lapsed in 
1948, and the consequent discontinuance of the most-favoured-nation treat-
ment it established began to produce restrictive effects on some of Chile's 
exports from 1952 onwards. In this latter year the tariff reductions 
granted by Venezuela to the United States in relation to preserved temperate-
zone fruit and certain copper manufactures were first applied. The most-
favoured-nation clause having disappeared with t he expiration of the modus 
vivendi, these benefits could not be extended to similar exports from 
Chile. As from the year mentioned the proportional decrease in Chile's 
contribution to Venezuela's supplies of the goods concerned can clearly 
7/ be seen from the available statistics,-' 
(c) Other agreements 
22. Between 1934 and 1948, Venezuela was a party to a bilateral agreement 
with Colombia for the regulation of border trade, especially in relation to 
Venezuela's exports of salt, cattle and tinned fish. It exempted goods ±r\ 
transit through Venezuela from payment of duties, but did not establish 
the most-favoured-nation clause with respect to trade between the two countri 
23. From 1943 to 1949 a modus vivendi was in force between Venezuela and 
Haiti, the sole object of which was to institute most-favoured-nation treahosE 
5. Special arrangements 
24« Apart from international agreements proper, a common practice has been 
for the Banco Agrícola y Pecuario de Venezuela to imake. administrative 
arrangements with State departments in other Latin American countries 
- such as, for example, the Colombian National Institute of Supply 
(Instituto Nacional de Abastecimiento - INA) - with a view to the barter 
of rice, sugar and maize from the countries in question against the sur-
plus production of the Venezuelan canning industry, part of the value of 
these surpluses being paid in dollars. 
2/ Imports of uncoated copper wire from Chile represented over 31 per cent 




B. FOREIGN TRADE REGIME 
• 1. The customs tariff 
25. Venezuela's customs tariff was reformed on 1 January 1959, on the basis 
of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), especially as 
adapted for the Standard Central American Tariff Nomenclature (Nomenclatura 
Arancelaria Uniforme Centroamericana - NAUCA). This reform did not alter 
the previous structure of that part of the tariff which relates to duties, 
and was confined to the reclassification of the existing duties under the 
new nomenclature • 
26. Predominant in the tariff are specific duties, supplemented in some 
cases by an ad valorem tax which may amount to as much as 100 per cent. 
For such articles as wireless sets, passenger cars, refrigerators, etc., the 
tariff establishes a scale of specific duties varying according to the unit 
weight of the product concerned. 
27. For purposes of the liquidation of ad valorem duties the competent 
authorities are empowered to determine the values of goods on which these 
duties are payable. 
28. Various surcharges on the total amount represented by import duties also 
exist, and are applicable when the goods are brought into the country under 
special conditions or without fulfilment of some given requisite. Outstanding 
among these surcharges is that of 30 per cent payable on goods from the 
Guianas or from non-self-governing territories in the West Indies. 
29. In addition to the import duties shown in the customs tariff, a 
consular fee is charged, which ranges from 2 to 3*5 per cent of the f.o.b. 
value of the goods according to the amount of imports involved. 
2. Imports 
30. Recentlyf^Venezuela modified its traditional exchange system by 
establishing direct control of international exchange transfers. 
31. In conformity with these new measures, foreign exchange earnings on 
exports of iron ore arid other non-combustible ores, instead of being 
liquidated on the free market as before, will be bought by the Central Bank 
at the purchase rate of 3.33 bolivares to the dollar. 
8/ 8 November I960 /32. This 
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32* This foreign exchange, like that deriving from exports of hydrocarbons 
and purchased by the Central Bank at a rate of 3»09 bolivares to the dollar, 
as well as the revenue accruing to the Bank from the conversion into 
national currency of capital brought into the country after the establishment 
of exchange controls, will be used to cover the following requirements: those 
of the State and its autonomous institutes; imports by the private sector, 
insurance and reinsurance; transport costs; students' allowances and subsist-
ence remittances for relatives; and certain transfers connected with movements 
of capital and invisible trade. Foreign exchange earnings from coffee and 
cacao exports, if sold to the Central Bank, are earmarked for the same 
purposes, although it should be noted that in the case of these products the 
exporter may liquidate his foreign exchange on the free market if he chooses. 
33« The purchase of foreign exchange to defray import payments is authorized 
by the Central Bank on receipt of the following data: importer's name and 
type of activity; name of shipper or forwarding agent; full description of the 
goods concerned showing the relevant tariff item; f»o.b# and c.i.f. values of 
the merchandize; and country of origin. 
34* When this formality has been completed and the Central Bank's authoriz-
ation obtained, the foreign exchange needed can be purchased as soon as the 
goods concerned have reached a Venezuelan port or been despatched thereto. 
In particular circumstances, however, advance payments may be made and 
guarantees given. In such cases, a deposit in national currency is 
required, equivalent to 40 per cent of the value of the foreign exchange in 
question. Similarly, another guarantee deposit of up to 20 per cent is 
stipulated in respect of specific foreign exchange drafts for external 
payments on account. 
35• These deposits will not yield interest. They will be incorporated 
into the national treasury as fines, if the operations for which they were 
made are not transacted within the predetermined time limits, i.e., 120 and 
180 days respectively, for imports from the American continent and for those 
from other regions. In the case of import commodities which usually take 
a longer time to despatch - such as, for instance, capital goods - the time 




36. The customs tariff is used as an instrument of trade policy in two ways -
through its scale of duties, and through exemptions from these in the interests 
of domestic productive activities, 
37« Another instrument of trade policy is the system of prior import licences 
through which essentially quantitative restrictions, sometimes amounting to 
prohibition, are applied, 
38, Exemption from duties may be total or partial. The goods benefited 
may be raw materials and intermediate or semi-manufactured products, machinery, 
implements and other industrial or agricultural requirements. 
One of the conditions on which, exemptions are granted in favour of raw 
materials is that neither they nor substitutes utilizable for the same purpose 
be produced in Venezuela, unless such domestic production is substantially 
inadequate in quantity or quality. 
When domestic production does exist, exemption for raw materials is 
accorded only to the extent necessary to cover the deficit. It is often 
granted on the condition that a certain amount of raw material be purchased 
from domestic sources. In other cases the quantity certified to be 
required by the enterprise submitting the application is exempted usually 
for a period of six months, 
39, There is a long list of raw materials and other goods for purely 
industrial use which can be imported wholly or partly duty-free. Exemptions 
or reductions in respect of these totalled a little over 134 million bolivares 
(40 million dollars) in 1959, as against 128 million in 1958 and 106 million 
in 1957. 
In addition to the exemptions granted in favour of the manufacturing 
industry and agriculture, the amount of which is also considerable, there are 
others extended to the petroleum industry, to official agencies and in favour 
of certain goods for mass consumption. 
40, The licence requirement is basically a protectionist measure, the aim 
of which is to control imports of certain goods similar to lines of domestic 
production which it is desired to protect or encourage. It should be noted 
that in exceptional instances this requirement may have a different purpose, 
Buch is the case, for example, with wheat, where the object of the licence 




corresponding international agreement. 
Through the licence system an endeavour is made to limit imports of 
most of the products affected to the amount of deficit in domestic supplies, 
or, in other words, to the difference between local consumption and production. 
To this end, quotas are sometimes established, or importing is confined to 
given periods of the year. This applies, for instance, to imports of garlic, 
onion, potatoes and other agricultural commodities, which are licensed on 
the basis of quotas determined in conformity with the Ministry of Agriculture's 
recommendations. 
41» In the case of a few products, the licence is granted only if the 
importer buys a given quantity of the same article from domestic sources. 
42. In that of some commodities, imports are suspended, or an official 
monopoly exists. 
3. Exports 
43* Foreign exchange, earnings from petroleum exports are purchased by the 
Central Bank at the rate of 3.09 bolivares to the dollar up to a certain 
sum, and 3*05 for the excess. The exchange rate for other exports is 3»33 
bolivares to the dollar. Varying proportions of coffee and cacao exports, 
in certain circumstances, are granted special rates whic% may rise to 4*80 
and 4»25 bolivares, respectively, in varying proportions and under a system 
whereby the r ate improves as the world price of the commodity concerned 
declines. 
